TL 2617

The Timor story

By Helen Hill




KALIMANTAN
(Borneo)
SULAWESI
(Celebes)
South Moluccas
IRIAN JAYA
(West Irian)
INDONESIA
Jakarta
JAVA
EAST TIMOR
Darwin

The island of Timor has been largely bypassed by history, bypassed by the cultural influences of Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam, which so deeply influenced the other islands of the Indonesian archipelago; the eastern half of the island has been a sleepy outpost of the Portuguese empire for the last four hundred years. Briefly dragged onto the stage of history during the second world war, Timor became vital in the war against the Japanese. In April 1974, a coup on the other side of the world brought some democratic freedoms to the Timorese people for the first time, and with them came the hope that the colony might seek independence and govern itself, like all the other countries in the region. However, the tragedy of the Timorese people may be that their opportunity for self-determination came at the wrong time, that freedom for the 650,000 residents of East Timor may be seen as too great a threat to its neighbours, Indonesia and Australia, for it to be allowed. There is now overwhelming evidence that the Indonesian government has been actively trying to prevent the independence of East Timor for some time, and Australia has done nothing to prevent Indonesian intervention in the politics of East Timor. It is worth remembering that there is no other country, apart from Papua New Guinea, where the Australian government's role will be so crucial in deciding its future as East Timor.


TIMOR
ATAURO
DILI
Baucau
Lospalos
Baguia
Manatuto
Liquica
Aileu
Atabae
Maubisse
Viqueque
Balibo
Batugade
EAST TIMOR
Atambua
Betano
Fatu Mean
Suai
Oe-Cusse
INDONESIAN TIMOR
KUPANG

TIMOR INFORMATION SERVICE, 1st floor, 183 Gertrude Street, Fitzroy, Vic. 3065. Australia.
Second Edition

The Timor story

The people of Timor

The people of Timor are of diverse ethnic origins; the original inhabitants, whose descendants live in the mountainous interior, are in many ways similar to Australian aboriginals. Waves of early immigrants are thought to have come from Indonesia and Papua. There are between 16 and 40 indigenous languages, the most common one being Tetum, which is used in several areas of East Timor and is the closest to a *lingua franca.*[1]

Traditional Timorese society consisted of five classes of people – *Liurai*, the greater chiefs or kings; *dato*, the lesser chiefs or nobles; *ema-reino*, commoners, free but not of noble blood; *ata*, slaves; and *lutun*, cattle keepers. These classes were more clearly defined before the coming of the Portuguese, but are still used on the Eastern side of Timor.[2]

The Coming of the Portuguese

The Portuguese have a long and colourful history in Asia.[3] Portuguese traders were attracted to Timor by its sandalwood, but long before Vasco da Gama had rounded the Cape of Good Hope Timor was well known to the Chinese as their best source of the precious wood, and Chinese and Arab traders had a monopoly on its trade. After the Portuguese conquered Malacca in 1511, they made yearly visits to Timor to pick up sandalwood to take to their colony of Macao on the China coast, where it was sold to Chinese merchants.

The first actual Portuguese settlement in the area was by Dominican friars who built a fort at Solor on a nearby island to shelter native converts. Around this fort a settlement grew up populated by the offspring of Portuguese soldiers, sailors and traders from Malacca and Macao who married local women. This class of 'Black Portuguese' or 'Topasses' played a very important role in Timorese history. With the coming of the Dutch in 1613, a great struggle for the control of the sandalwood trade commenced. The 'Topasses' were forced to retreat from their fort in Solor to Larantuka on Flores, and eventually to Timor where they established themselves at Lifau, in what is now the enclave of Oe-Cusse. Two families, the Da Costas and the De Hornays, vied with each other for the leadership of the motley band of Portuguese sailors, Chinese smugglers, Goan adventurers, Dutch deserters and wayward Dominicans which made up the male part of the settlement.

While acknowledging the formal rule of Portugal and seeking its support against the Dutch, the 'Topasses' resisted any attempts by the Portuguese authorities in Goa and Macao to interfere in local affairs. In 1702, the Portuguese succeeded in appointing the first governor from Goa to Lifau, despite opposition from the 'Black Portuguese'. This was the beginning of a protracted battle between the 'Black Portuguese' and the 'White Portuguese', with armies of local people under their own kings, the *liurai*, being used by both sides. The governor, in an attempt to enlist support of the local Timorese, appointed all *liurai* to the rank of colonel and gave lower ranks to the *datos.* In 1769, the governor abandoned Lifau to the rebels and moved, with 12,000 evacuees, to Dili.

Apart from a brief period of British rule during the Napoleonic wars, the battle between the Portuguese and the Dutch for the control of the sandalwood riches continued for another two centuries. When the war finally

The Timorese have been fighting against colonialism for over four hundred years - a contemporary drawing of the battle of Cailaco in 1726.



came to an end in 1904 with the signing of the Luso-Hollandesa treaty defining the boundaries between Dutch and Portuguese territory, the 'Topasses' or 'Black Portuguese' in Lifau elected to come under the Portuguese crown rather than Dutch rule, so the enclave of Oe-Cusse remained Portuguese territory. There are many families in Oe-Cusse today who trace their ancestry back to the original 'Topasses'. There has been much subsequent intermarriage by Timorese with African, Goan and European Portuguese 'deportados', people who were banished to Timor for opposing the Portuguese regime, particularly under the dictatorship of Salazar.

Uprisings against the Portuguese

Before 'pacification' by the Portuguese some of the *liurais* were very powerful, particularly those who could organise their subjects to cut the sandalwood and deliver it to the coast. They gained a near monopoly in the cloth, iron and guns traded into the island.[4] From 1910 to 1912 there was a large-scale rebellion against Portuguese rule in Timor; it was led by a *liurai*, Dom Boaventura from the south-central Manu-fahi district, who actually established a seat of government which lasted 18 months and covered an area of 16,000 hectares.[5] The Melbourne *Argus* in February 1912, described raids on Dili, the looting of Government House, the killing of Portuguese officers and the burning of buildings.[6] The rebellion was only quelled when two Portuguese troopships arrived from Mozambique and Lisbon in August 1912. Over 3000 Timorese were killed and 4000 captured for taking part in the rebel activities.[7]

After putting down the revolt in 1912, the Portuguese attempted to reduce the power of the *liurai* by dividing their authority among the *dato*. Where *liurai* are still found they almost always represent a broken succession, the present rulers being chosen from leaders of groups who were faithful to Portugal during the revolt.[8]

Australian interest in Timor

The Melbourne *Argus* pointed out to its readers in February 1912: "the trouble in Timor is interesting to Australians seeing that . . . Port Dili, the scene of the outrages, is closer to Port Darwin than Hobart is to Melbourne." But another thing that was worrying Australians at the time was the rumour that Portugal was planning to sell Timor to Germany. Despite the fact that it was untrue, the reaction by the Australian government showed that Australia's interest in Timor was primarily strategic.[9]

Australia first established a diplomatic post in Dili in 1941 and in December of that year a contingent of Australian troops was despatched to Timor as part of a larger Dutch-Australian force to fight the Japanese in the second world war. Portugal remained neutral during the war and protested at the sending of the troops. Britain, as Portugal's ancient ally, feared embarrassment and Australia and Britain agreed to withdraw the forces, provided Portuguese troops were sent to defend the colony against impending Japanese invasion. Five hundred Portuguese troops set out from Laurenzo Marques by sea for Timor, but by the time they reached the straits of Malacca the Japanese were in full command of the area and they turned back to Mozambique. Only then did the Portuguese governor accept, under protest, the presence of the Australian and Dutch troops.[10]

The 2/2 Independent Company of Australian commandos fought a guerilla war in the mountains of Timor against the Japanese for some 18 months before they were relieved by another independent company, the 2/4. Although fewer than 400 in number, they succeeded in holding down 20,000 Japanese troops, killing 1,500 of them and losing only 40 of their own men. About 40,000 Timorese were killed by the Japanese because they had helped the Australians. Many towns, including Dili, were destroyed by Australian bombing and even larger losses of life resulted from the famine which the fighting precipitated. After the war a number of Timorese were evacuated to Australia when the Australian forces were finally withdrawn.[11]

In one of the first statements on Timor in the Australian parliament, Dr Evatt, ALP Minister for External Affairs, said in October 1943: "As a result of the war, Australia must show a particular interest in the welfare system of control of these islands and territories that lie close to our shores. From the point of view of defence, trade and transport, most of them can be fairly described as coming within an extended Australian zone . . . Timor, part of which is Portuguese and part Dutch, was of importance to the overseas air services between Australia and Europe. The island in enemy hands is a constant threat to Australia. If properly placed within the zone of Australian security it would become a bastion of our defence."[12]

But any suggestions that Australia should occupy Timor, including one that Australia might lease Timor from Portugal for 100 years, touched the Portuguese on a very sensitive spot. For in 1943, fearful of losing any of its colonies, Lisbon had used the Azores Base agreement with the United Kingdom as a means of obtaining assurances from South Africa and Australia that the former had no designs on Angola and the latter had none on Timor.[13] So after the war Australia pledged to support Portuguese sovereignty over Timor as a *quid pro quo* for the availability of the Azores as an Atlantic base for the Allies. Although the Liberal opposition, in particular Percy Spender, was critical of Dr Evatt for this, when the Liberals came to power in 1950 and Spender became Minister for External Affairs, he too continued to support Portuguese rule over Timor.

Following the war Timor slid from the Australian consciousness, it ceased to be a stopover for the QANTAS flying boats and lost most of the political significance it had had during the war. Timor Oil, an Australian company, was formed in 1956 with the specific object of developing oil resources in Portuguese Timor.[14]

Timor and Indonesia

Following the second world war, the independence forces in Indonesia, with some help from Australian trade unions, particularly the Seaman's Union and the Waterside Workers Federation, succeeded in throwing off Dutch colonial rule.[15]



THE SUN

WEDNESDAY

WHARFIES AND DUTCH IN CLASH

LOTTERY 19


INDONESIA 1965
"INDONESIA IS THE BEST THING THAT'S HAPPENED TO UNCLE SAM SINCE WORLD WAR II!"
... A WORLD BANK OFFICIAL...
... ONE DAY IN LATE 1964 DAVID ROCKEFELLER LEARNED THE AWFUL TRUTH – SUKARNO, THE FATHER OF INDONESIA, DESPITE THEIR GENEROUS GIFTS, WAS TURNING INTO A COMMUNIST! (AND JUST AS HE LEARNED THAT INDONESIA HAD THE LARGEST OIL SUPPLY ON EARTH!)... HE IMMEDIATELY SENT HENRY KISSINGER, OF HARVARD, TO WORK, TRAINING FRIENDLY INDONESIANS TO TAKE OVER AND RUN THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT... THEN THE C.I.A., THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, THE BERKELEY MAFIA, (UNIVERSITY OF CAL.) THE FORD FOUNDATION, M.I.T AND HARVARD BEGAN PLANNING AND WORKING... AFTER THE COUP IN 1965 THE ROCKEFELLER TRAINED PEOPLE TOOK OVER... 500,000 TO A MILLION COMMUNISTS AND PEASANTS WERE MASSACRED... AND STANDARD OIL GOT IT'S HANDS ON THE LARGEST OIL RESERVE IN THE WORLD... THE SULTAN OF DJKARTA AND MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT (WHO HAS 10,000 SERVANTS IN HIS PALACE) EXPLAINS HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION:
... AND TRICKY DICKY EXPLAINS HIS BATTLE STRATEGY:
"THE CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT SINCE 1966 HAVE LED TO A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN CAPITAL, GENTLEMEN, INDONESIA IS A GOLDMINE OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND WE HAVE A LARGE SUPPLY OF CHEAP LABOR WHICH WE CAN OFFER YOU... OUR UNIVERSITIES PRODUCE A LARGE NUMBER OF EDUCATED PERSONNEL WHO WILL SERVE NEW CORPORATIONS WITH PLEASURE... INDONESIA IS WAITING FOR YOUR INITIATIVE"
"INDONESIA IS THE GREATEST PRIZE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA..."

Indonesia has had its own problems of foreign intervention

Independence for Indonesia, including the western half of Timor, did not greatly affect Portuguese Timor. The new government of the Republic of Indonesia under Sukarno was strongly anti-colonialist and launched a campaign of 'Confrontation' against Malaysia, which it regarded as a British colonial creation. However, Portuguese colonialism in Timor never came in for such an attack, neither were there any attempts to annex it, for, unlike West Irian, it had never been a part of the Dutch empire.[16]

The Indonesian government, however, had enough trouble keeping the people in its own outer islands under rule from Java, and when, in 1958, a dissident group, the PRRI, declared a republic in Sumatra it was supported by the Permesta movement, a similar movement centred in north Sulawesi. By 1959 these regional rebellions had been put down by the Indonesian army and a number of leaders of the defeated Permesta movement arrived in Portuguese Timor and were granted political asylum. Some months later they initiated an uprising near Viqueque on the south coast. The Portuguese raised a militia from the neighbouring area of Lospalos to put down the revolt and 500 to 1000 people were killed. The aims of the movement are unclear; there may have been, as FRETILIN leaders claim, some pro-independence elements among the Timorese supporters of it. APODETI claims it was a movement for integration with Indonesia, but the plan of the Indonesian exiles leading it was more likely to attempt to seize East Timor and use it as a base from which to wrest control of their own islands from Java.[17] In Australia these events went almost unnoticed. There was some speculation in the press as to whether Indonesia would launch an attack on Portuguese colonialism in Timor, but it was ended by the coup and massacres in Indonesia in 1965, which brought in the Suharto government and the ending of 'Confrontation' with Malaysia.

Australian policy on Timor

In the early sixties a number of Australian journalists had visited Timor and written articles which were highly critical of the Portuguese colonial rule; as a result journalists were banned from visiting Timor, and it became even more isolated from the outside world.[18]

There must have been quite a few Australians who wondered where this place, Timor, was when Gough Whitlam, deputy leader of the Labor Party, giving the Roy Milne memorial lecture in Adelaide in 1963, said: "Eastern Timor must appear as an anachronism to every country in the world except Portugal . . . we would not have a supporter in the world if we backed the Portuguese . . . they must be told in no uncertain times that the standard of living must be rapidly raised, and the right of self determination fully granted . . . through the U.N. we must act quickly to meet this problem." The ALP at its Federal Conference in Adelaide that year committed itself to the 'liberation of Eastern Timor' but this policy was dropped after the 1966 Federal Conference.[19]

So the Labor Party came to power in December 1972 with no policy on Portuguese Timor. The Australian Consulate in Dili had been closed in 1971 by the Liberal government, the official reason being given as "reduced consular and visa functions which did not justify the expense of maintaining it".[20]

The potential for Portuguese Timor to expose contradictions in the Australian Labor government's new foreign policy was noticed by quite a few people in early 1973 following the publication of that year's annual report on Portuguese Timor to the United Nations General Assembly by the UN's Special Committee on Decolonization. The report hit the front page of the *Australian Financial Review*, which alleged that BHP was exploring for minerals and TAA was flying Portuguese troops to the colony in defiance of General Assembly resolutions which Australia had supported.[21] Certain sections of the press and community groups, including the Australian Council of Churches and Catholic Bishops' educational agency, Action for World Development, and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, were quick to issue statements calling on the government to sever all commercial links with the colony.[22] Senator Willesee was questioned in parliament about the political implications of the activities of BHP and TAA. In the Senate on May 23, 1973 he said: "at the latest session of the General Assembly of the U.N. Australia supported resolution 2918, which reaffirms the right of the Portuguese territories to self-determination and independence. Operative paragraphs of the resolution are, however, specifically directed to the situation in Portuguese African territories. Portuguese Timor is not named in the resolution."[23] One journalist, implying the inadequacy of Senator Willesee's reply, pointed out that clause 1 of the resolution quoted by Willesee in the Senate refers to "African and other territories under Portuguese domination".[24]

It was obvious, even then, that Timor was to be an exception to Australia's attitude to independence for the

Portuguese colonies. In July 1973, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on Portuguese Timor in which it stated: "The Australian Government fully supports the principle of self-determination and independence for non-self-governing territories, but, in the absence of any indications of a significant indigenous 'liberation' movement in Portuguese Timor or of any international efforts to change the status of the territory, Australia's present commerical relations do not appear inconsistent with our U.N. policies and obligations."[25]

Indonesia had broken off diplomatic relations with Portugal in 1963, as part of a move by non-aligned countries against Portuguese colonialism. Before 1974 Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, had made several statements to the effect that if a liberation movement started in Portuguese Timor the Indonesian government would support it, if the indigenous people wished this. In 1972, this statement was made in the course of refuting allegations that the Soviet Union was financing such a movement as part of its Indian Ocean strategy.[26]

The Lisbon coup

Immediately following the Armed Forces Movement coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974 there was considerable confusion in Timor. Due to poor communications between Portugal and the colony, most people in Timor first heard about the changes in Portugal by Radio Australia, directly or indirectly. Although it was not immediately obvious what would be happening in Timor as a result of the coup, there was general elation among the small group of Timorese who had been opposed to Portuguese rule. This small informal group had met every Sunday morning, in a park in front of the government offices. Most of them worked for the government in low positions or were high school students. They had some idea of the existence of the liberation movements in the Portuguese African colonies, but had no contacts with them. One of the regular attenders at this meeting, Jose Ramos Horta, a journalist for the government paper *A Voz de Timor*, had been exiled for a year to Mozambique where he was allowed to work as a journalist, but only under very strict supervision from the Portuguese government. As in all Portuguese colonies, the secret police or DGS were everywhere in Timor and informers were also used by the government to detect any possible anti-government activity. Jose Ramos Horta was due to be exiled a second time on April 27, 1974 following the publication, in Darwin, of some remarks he inadvertently made to an Australian journalist. He was saved by the Lisbon coup of April 25.

In a statement on the Lisbon coup on April 29, 1974, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Willesee made no mention of Timor. He merely noted that "the granting of new freedoms within metropolitan Portugal would be bound to have important implications for Portugal's overseas territories, particularly the African territories of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique."[27]

Immediately the news reached Timor that Portugal would be granting independence to its colonies the informal anti-fascist group organised itself into a political party. They called it the *Associacão Social Democrática de Timor*, ASDT, a social democratic party. The two most important changes following the Lisbon coup, for the founders of this party, were the removal of the secret police and informers and the fact that striking would no longer be illegal. The Committee for the Defence of Labour was formed by the ASDT, which organised a strike of workers within a few days of the coup, as a result of which they got a 100% rise in wages.[28]

ASDT issued its first manifesto on May 22. Its political activities were to be based on the right to independence, the rejection of colonialism, and the immediate participation of worthy Timorese elements in the administration and local government; no racial discrimination; a struggle against corruption, and a policy of good neighbourliness and of co-operation with the countries of the geographical area in which Timor is situated.



Jose Ramos Horta, now Minister for Foreign Affairs of East Timor - his family has a long history of opposition to Portuguese colonialism

But the predominant feeling in Dili was by no means pro-independence. A group of administration workers, fearing that the new order might mean some loss of privileges for themselves, formed the *União Democratica Timorense*, UDT, which was essentially a union to protect the status quo. Among the founders of the UDT were mainly Timorese who had benefited from Portuguese rule. Among them were members of the Portuguese fascist party, *Accao National Popular*, which had been disbanded immediately following the April 25 coup. UDT President, Lopez de Cruz, editor of *A Voz de Timor*, had been a member of this party, and he and Costa Mouzinho, UDT Vice-President and Mayor of Dili had been its representatives to the National Assembly under Caetano in Lisbon.

The educational philosophy of Portuguese colonialism had encouraged the formation of a small native elite which is culturally Portuguese, the *assimilado* class. Most of the founders of all the parties are of this class, although their followers are not. The UDT founders were among the most successful *assimilados*, with a knowledge of and love for Portuguese culture rivalling that even in Portugal. They envisaged Timor as part of a federation of Portuguese speaking states with strong cultural and trading links with Portugal. This vision was partly inspired by the book *Portugal and the Future* by General Spinola, which had been very significant in the arousing of public opinion against the Caetano regime early in 1974. The UDT initially wanted to keep the links with Portugal as intact as possible, but changes in Portugal, including the overthrow of Spinola as governor, forced them to change their position.[29]



Adam Malik
Menteri Luar Negeri
Republik Indonesia

Jakarta, 17th June 1974.

To :
Mr. Jose Manuel Ramos Horta
Dili
Portuguase Timor.

Dear Mr. Horta :

I was pleased to meet you during your recent visit to Jakarta, Indonesia.

We, the people of Indonesia, and the Government of Indonesia, have been heartened by the recent changes that have taken place in Lisbon, Portugal.

This change og government and of policy outlook came as something of a surprise to most people, including you and your people in Timor.

In our view, these developments offer a good opportunity to the people of Timor to accelerate the prosess towards independence, as well as to generate overall national development and to promote the progress of the people of Timor.

The Government of Indonesia untill now still adheres to the following principles :

I. The independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exeption for the people in Timor.

II. The Government as well as the people of Indonesia have no intention to increase or to expand their territory, or to occupy other territories other that what is stipulated in their Constitution. This reiteration is to give you a clear idea, so that there may be no doubt in the minds of the people of Timor in expresing their own wishes.

III. For this reason, whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence, can be assured that the Government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and cooperation for the benefit of both countries.

Please convey my message to your people in Timor.

With my best wishes and warm regards to you and to all the people in Timor.

Sincerely yours,

ADAM MALIK.

UDT was initially the most successful party; even before it had worked out its party platform it was able to attract large numbers of supporters in the villages by means of symbols such as the Portuguese flag, which in many parts of Timor had become a religious symbol or *Lulic*. In addition, the Portuguese administration, prior to the arrival of the new Governor in November 1974, made many facilities available to the UDT, including trucks for driving people to demonstrations.

The third party in Timor was formed about a month after the Lisbon coup. It was founded by Osorio Soares, who had been thinking of joining the ASDT but "only if it sought independence within Indonesia rather than on its own." He wanted to call his party the *Associacão Integraciao Timor Indonesia*, the Association for Timor-Indonesian integration, but this was not allowed by the Portuguese authorities, so it was renamed *Associacão Popular Democratica Timorense*, commonly known by the initials APODETI. Another leader of APODETI, Arnaldo Arujio, made great capital out of a visit to Jakarta, where he announced to the Indonesian government and press that APODETI had the support of 70% of the people in Timor. He also freely admitted to the Indonesian press to having spent the last 29 years in prison on a charge of collaborating with the Japanese during the second world war.[30]

In June 1974 José Ramos Horta, secretary of the political committee of ASDT, made a visit to Jakarta, his main aim being to get a guarantee from the Indonesian government that it would support the right to independence of East Timor. His visit was far more successful than he expected and he came away with a letter from Adam Malik stating clearly that "the independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor". The letter went on to say: "whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence can be assured that the government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations."

Inspired by this success, Horta made a visit to Australia the following month. Although he had a fairly good reception from the press, some trade union leaders, Labor Party backbenchers, and Andrew Peacock, Opposition spokesman on Foreign Affairs, there was no support forthcoming for the idea of Timorese independence from the government.

The Whitlam-Suharto talks Jogjakarta, September 1974

ASDT supporters were not expecting such a quick rebuff to their aspirations of independence as they got when they heard the outcome of the Whitlam-Suharto talks over Radio Australia. According to a Foreign Affairs official who briefed journalists, Mr Whitlam in his talks with President Suharto on September 5 had said: "an independent Timor would be an unviable state and a potential threat to the area"; however "the Prime Minister was thought to have made clear that the people of the colony should have the ultimate decision on their future."[31]

Up till this time President Suharto had not made any statements on Timor, although considerable coverage had been given to the Timorese parties in the Indonesian press, particularly APODETI. The statement from the Whitlam-Suharto talks had an immediate effect in Dili: the leaders of ASDT realised that their main battle for independence was going to be against Indonesia and not against Portugal.

The ASDT, at its General Assembly on September 12, 1974, voted in a new manifesto which, among other things, changed the party's name to *Frente Revolucionària de Timor Leste Independente* (Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor), or FRETILIN. The idea behind this was that FRETILIN would aim to be a broad front representing all pro-independence forces in East Timor and not be identified with any particular political philosophy such as social democracy. It would later appeal to the Portuguese for recognition as the legitimate representative of the Timorese people as FRELIMO was recognised in Mozambique.[32]

One of its first actions as FRETILIN was to organise a demonstration against the possible incorporation of Timor by Indonesia, as had been suggested during the Whitlam-Suharto talks. 5000 people marched to the Indonesian consulate, where a note was handed to the Consul, Mr Tomadok, asking his government not to intervene in East Timor.[33]

Also on September 12, 1974, *Sinar Harapan*, a Jakarta daily, reported that a meeting had taken place in Kupang, capital of Indonesian Timor, between the Governor of the province of East Nusatenggara Timur, El Tari, and the General Secretary of APODETI, Osorio Soares. El Tari had agreed, at this meeting, that he and his government would be prepared to assist the struggle of APODETI. Soon after this, Radio Kupang started broadcasting a nightly one hour program in the local languages of East Timor (not spoken in Indonesian Timor) in which the general theme, repeated nightly, was that FRETILIN is communist and is always killing innocent villagers and cutting off babies' heads while UDT was more fascist than the Portuguese colonialists. In March 1975 I listened to several of these broadcasts, through an interpreter. Whenever the subject of Australian policy came up, as it did frequently that month, it was always quoted as the first part of Whitlam's statement made during the talks with Suharto in September 1974, without the qualification that the Timorese should decide their own future.

Many people in Australia, as in Timor, were puzzled about Whitlam's statement. Why did he feel the need to make such a hasty statement on the future of Timor? Was the real reason for supporting integration with Indonesia really that



Did Mr Whitlam make a gift of East Timor to President Suharto in September 1974.?

an independent East Timor would be an 'unviable state', and what does that mean? Also what would the governments of small nations such as Fiji and the newly independent Guinea-Bissau think of such a statement coming from an Australian Prime Minister?

Peter Hastings has suggested that Whitlam received a 'very unsophisticated' briefing from the Foreign Affairs Department before leaving for Jogjakarta[34] and Hugh Armfield, defence correspondent for *The Age* claims that "certain areas of the Defence Department are understood to be strongly opposed to Timor becoming associated with Indonesia. They would prefer to see it independent. These Defence people and Foreign Affairs are believed to have had considerable hassle before Mr. Whitlam accepted the brief on association with Indonesia." The Defence Department's thinking, according to Armfield, is based on the significance of Timor during World War II and the future of Indonesia itself. The Defence people, he says,"point to Portuguese Timor's closeness to Australia and to the fact that it was used by Japan in the last war for reconnaissance flights over Australia and could again be of strategic importance. They also believe that Indonesia is not as stable as other people (particularly Foreign Affairs) think and that there is a possibility of a government hostile to Australia emerging in Jakarta, which would make Portuguese Timor of vital importance. So they favour the colony being independent or in some way strongly linked with Australia".[35]

Nevertheless it has been reported that many people in the Department of Foreign Affairs felt that Mr. Whitlam had gone too far in attempting to decide the fate of Timor. According to Mungo McCallum, parliamentary press gallery correspondent for the *Nation Review,* there were attempts made by Foreign Affairs to 'tone down' Whitlam's statement in the official records of the Jogjakarta talks, which he resisted.[36]

About this time the Indonesian army newspaper *Berita Yuhda* started a series of articles on the growth of communism in Portuguese Timor. It accused the Timorese students who had returned from studying in Lisbon of being Maoists, a Chinese captain in the army was accused of giving military training to Chinese civilians in Timor and four generals from Peking supposedly entered Portuguese Timor via Canberra.[37] This appears to be the beginning of a strange sort of propaganda campaign within Indonesia to discredit both the Portuguese authorities and FRETILIN and UDT. *Berita Yuhda* was the first Indonesian newspaper to start this type of propaganda but later *Sinar Harapan* and the government news-agency Antara also started publishing similarly inflammatory articles on Timor which could as easily be demonstrated to be untrue.

All the parties in Timor took the opportunity to show their strength during the visit of the Portuguese Minister for extra-territorial co-ordination, Dr. Almeida Santos, during October 1974. A crowd of 5,000 met him at the airport. For many villagers it was their first visit to Dili, and many of them brought out 400 year old Portuguese flags from their religious shrines, which touched the Minister very much. But he mistook it as an expression of love for Portugal, and UDT interpreted it as support for their policies. About half the crowd had FRETILIN flags and a few hundred supported APODETI.[38]

The armed forces movement

One of the most significant changes in Portuguese colonial rule in Timor came with the arrival of a new Governor in November 1974. Colonel Mario Lemos Pires was a member of the *Movimento das Forcas Armadas* (Armed Forces Movement), and he brought with him other MFA members as advisors. The MFA is a movement unique in history, formed within the Portuguese army in 1973 it was led by experienced soldiers fed up with fighting a useless and losing battle against the liberation movements, especially in Guinea-Bissau. Many of its founders were well read in revolutionary theory and took on a great respect for the people they were supposed to be fighting. General Spinola was not a member of the MFA although for a time his interests coincided with it, for he too wanted to end the colonial wars and establish a federation of Portuguese-speaking states. His vision was very much supported by UDT but regarded as neo-colonialist by FRETILIN.[39]

The MFA members who arrived in Timor in November to take over the administration of the colony were committed to the process of decolonization; they brought with them some techniques used in Portugal itself, such as the program of 'cultural dynamization' or political education, and a model for a constituent assembly and transitional government based on that in Angola, which also has three parties. They believed that it would be some time before meaningful national elections could be held, due to fear of intimidation, but they experimented in some areas with elections for local chiefs. Although the elections were not contested on a party basis, 90% of those elected were FRETILIN members.[40] In some ways the MFA rulers seemed naive and idealistic, especially in comparison to their Indonesian counterparts.

The governor, Mario Lemos Pires trained in 1972 for one year at the US army staff training college at Fort Leavenworth, in Kansas, after which he served under Spinola as chief of Social Affairs in Guinea-Bissau. His training has led him to be regarded by some left-wingers in Portugal as a CIA agent. In Timor he was regarded as a somewhat progressive conservative. FRETILIN welcomed his appointment in November as he ended a period of administration favouritism towards UDT, but later they complained that his administration once again seemed to be favouring UDT above the other parties. In February, the Indonesian news agency ANTARA claimed that Lemos Pires was a Communist and that he planned to hand over control of Timor to the marxist FRETILIN, which he strongly denied.

Of the other MFA members who arrived with Lemos Pires two of the most significant were Major Francisco Mota, chief of the political affairs bureau,and Major Costa Jonotas, chief of the social communications bureau. Both of them have been acting governor in the absence of Lemos Pires and both were elected to represent the Timor armed forces on the co-ordinating commission of the MFA in Lisbon and who were therefore more in touch with radical thinking in the MFA

Initially the UDT were very impressed by the neo-colonialist ideas of General Spinola.

than others in Timor.

The MFA administration was reluctant to impose any decisions on Timor which would be binding on the country when they left, their strategy was to try and involve all of the parties in various committees for decolonization in areas such as education, health, public administration, and the economy.

In general FRETILIN and UDT co-operated with them in this but APODETI did not. FRETILIN was particularly active on the committee for decolonization of education and as a result had a lot of influence in this area.

In December the MFA administration tried to set up a Government Council with representatives from each party to take part in decision making, the idea behind it was that on any issues on which all the parties agreed progress could be made before the formation of a transitional government. At first APODETI refused to participate; when they finally agreed, FRETILIN refused on the grounds that there were too many members of the proposed council who had been associated with the previous regime. They wanted to wait for the Commission on reclassification to finish its work. This body was set up to investigate and hear evidence regarding collaboration with the previous regime. Immediately following April 25, all the records of the secret police, *DGS*, had been destroyed, so there was no real evidence as to who had been an agent. However, fear of blackmail, intimidation etc. was still present and hampering the decolonization process. Some cases had been heard and some people had lost their jobs with the government. FRETILIN knew that several UDT members were in line to lose their jobs as a result of investigations by the commission of reclassification and did not want to sit on the same Government Council with them.

The FRETILIN – UDT coalition

On January 21, 1975 politics in Timor entered a new phase with the formation of a coalition between the UDT and FRETILIN. Following events in Portugal and the Whitlam-Suharto talks UDT found itself moving towards a more clear-cut position on independence, while FRETILIN recognised the importance of keeping the Portuguese in Timor for some time to help carry out the process of decolonization. The coalition document issued by the two parties rejected integration into a foreign power, namely Indonesia, but stressed good relations with Indonesia after independence. At the same time the two parties called on the Portuguese government to establish a transitional government with one third representation from FRETILIN, one third representation from UDT and one third from the Portuguese administration. The Portuguese welcomed the formation of the coalition but did not accept the form of transitional government suggested.

The coalition had the wide and enthusiastic support of members of both parties, a code of conduct was drawn up and the parties agreed on a principle of mutual respect for each other's programmes and no public attacks were to be made on the coalition partner. This worked well for a time; the height of co-operation between FRETILIN and UDT was probably the visit of a delegation of Australian trade union, student and community organisation representatives in March. The delegation was invited by the coalition and huge crowds from both parties welcomed the visitors wherever they went. As well as shouts of 'Viva FRETILIN' and 'Viva UDT' from the crowds, there were shouts of *Viva coligacão* (long live the coalition).

The coalition also had the support of Major Mota and Major Jonotas of the MFA, who consulted FRETILIN and UDT leaders almost daily on matters of policy.

But UDT continued to lose members to FRETILIN, partly because FRETILIN leaders travelled around the island more, visiting several villages each weekend and becoming very well known. Xavier do Amaral, the President of FRETILIN became an extremely popular figure and wherever he goes in Timor people mob him. FRETILIN was also able to build a strong leadership in areas outside Dili, even in former UDT and APODETI strongholds.

FRETILIN had its party platform worked out sooner than UDT and by December 1974 had copies of it printed in Portuguese and Tetum, the most widely spoken of the local languages. About the same time it established two literacy schools for teaching reading and writing in the local language to adults and children. These schools use the *conscientizacão* method of literacy training developed by Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire and some spectacular results were achieved quite early. Many more of these schools have been built by local villagers and staffed by FRETILIN members. In addition the Vice President of FRETILIN, Nicolau Lobato, began to establish production co-operatives in the area of Bazartete, near Dili, and to study the problem of land reform. These projects were one of the main reasons for FRETILIN's early popularity.

FRETILIN was undoubtedly the party which was best able to make use of the period of uncertainty by concentrating its activities in the villages and building up a considerable following, while UDT leaders spent a good deal of their time debating their party program and APODETI concentrated on attacking the Portuguese for not holding a referendum.

As FRETILIN members were prominent in the secondary schools in Dili both as teachers and students they took the initiative in organising UNETIM, the National Union of Timorese Students. In addition to carrying out political, social, cultural and sporting activities within the schools UNETIM formed a backbone of the FRETILIN literacy programme and another ambitious project for collecting of local history and folklore to use in educational materials to encourage the 'decolonization' of education and culture.[41]

While FRETILIN and UDT agreed broadly on the issue of independence, they differed considerably on economic policy, particularly in relation to foreign investment, and their approach to the problem of Timor's 10,000 Chinese who had a stranglehold on the economy.

UDT was in favour of inviting in overseas companies, particularly Japanese and Australian ones, in the areas of tourism and mineral exploration. FRETILIN was more cautious and wanted a limited tourist industry built on local resources. While recognising the need for some foreign investment in minerals, oil, etc., FRETILIN stressed strict controls.

Both FRETILIN and UDT recognised the Chinese as a problem and were highly critical of them, not only because they made so much money out of the Timorese with their shops and other businesses, but also because they sent so much money out of the country, to Macao, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore or Australia, to invest on the stock exchanges and rarely, if ever, did they give jobs to Timorese.

FRETILIN's approach to the 'Chinese problem' was to undercut their exploitative practices by setting up distribution co-operatives for basic necessities in competition with them, leaving the Chinese to deal only in luxury items. UDT leaders, on the other hand, spoke of training Timorese in business skills to compete with the Chinese individually, a policy which would have had dubious success.

During the time of the coalition most of Timor's Chinese realised that their days of fantastic wealth were over. Many had planned to leave and began stockpiling Australian dollars for the purpose, causing the black-market to become the most flourishing industry in Timor.

Many Chinese gave donations to all three political parties in order to try and secure their future. In general, they did not favour integration with Indonesia, as they had heard stories of persecution of Chinese in Indonesia. About half Timor's Chinese were citizens of Taiwan, and a number of them went there early in 1975. A number of Timor's Chinese petitioned the Australian government for residence in Australia, but were refused — until after the UDT attempted coup in August.

Threats of invasion

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs seemed to be studiously ignoring developments in Portuguese Timor despite, or perhaps because of, reports they had since October 1974 that Indonesia might be planning some sort of military invasion.[42] Apart from a two man mission sent to Dili soon after the Lisbon coup, there had been no direct reporting from East Timor. The first secretary of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta set out for Dili in mid February, arriving there just as news reports were appearing on the front pages of Australian dailies that Indonesia was planning an armed invasion of Portuguese Timor. The origin of these articles appears to have been Australian intelligence reports. They claimed that the Indonesian government was planning an amphibious assault on Dili and a parachute attack on the Baucau airport, within the next few weeks.[43] The reports were leaked to the press by members of the Defence Department and the Joint Intelligence Organisation,[44] for reasons which undoubtedly were to demonstrate that the Labor government was not paying enough attention to Australia's defences.[45]


INDONESIA
TIMOR
PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN GRASS HOUSES SHOULD NOT THROW STONES!

'I RESPECT YOUR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, AS LONG AS YOU DECIDE TO JOIN US.'

The response from Foreign Affairs, particularly the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, was immediate. They sent cables to Canberra claiming that the release of the reports would jeopardise negotiations Australia was having with Indonesia, and that Australian-Indonesian relations would be wrecked.[46]

The reports in the Australian press coincided with a greatly stepped up press campaign in Indonesia which alleged that the Portuguese government had given control of the colony to 'leftist groups' which were using intimidation against their political rivals; that the governor had issued a permit to FRETILIN to buy arms; and that more than 300 refugees had crossed the border into Indonesian Timor to escape intimidation.[47] The Jakarta newspaper *New Standard*, which generally represents the views of General Ali Murtopo, President Suharto's advisor on national security who has taken responsibility for the Timor problem, came out with Indonesia's strongest claim to East Timor to date.

"Although Indonesia makes no legal claim whatsoever to Portuguese Timor, it regards the territory as geographically a part of the Indonesian world. For cultural, ethnic and historical reasons an integration of the territory into Indonesia would represent valid decolonization and the most natural source to that end."[48]

In Canberra a policy statement on Timor was worked out in time for the parliamentary debate brought on by Andrew Peacock raising the issue as a matter of public importance on February 25. The policy statement, outlined in parliament by the Minister for Science, Mr Morrison, was that "we support a measured and deliberate process of decolonization in Portuguese Timor through arrangements leading to an internationally acceptable act of self-determination".[49]

Nevertheless, there was a degree of dissatisfaction with this policy within the parliamentary Labor Party itself. In March 1975 a delegation of Labor Party members from the Caucus foreign affairs committee visited East Timor. They had long discussions with the leaders of each party, and also had an opportunity to gauge the relative support for each of the parties at mass demonstrations the parties staged for their visit. They also held extensive talks with the Portuguese administration and visited a number of villages. Through them, the Portuguese governor repeated his request for the Australian government to reopen its consulate in Dili. On their return to Canberra the delegation briefed Senator Willesee, and John Kerin, the leader of the delegation, briefed Foreign Affairs officials. Senator Arthur Gietzelt sent a letter to Mr Whitlam on behalf of the delegation stressing that they thought the re-opening of the consul was an urgent priority.[50] In his letter of reply, Mr Whitlam stated that "to re-open it now could be misinterpreted, political interests in Portuguese Timor could seek to use our presence to involve us to an extent which I do not feel would be appropriate for Australia." The Portuguese administration may have shown too much enthusiasm for the re-opening of the Australian consulate; they were somewhat concerned that the only other country with a consulate in Dili was Indonesia (Taiwan will close its consulate as Lisbon has recognised Peking), and they saw the consulate as very important in providing an alternative source of information to Australia about developments in Timor.

Andrew Peacock, Liberal Party spokesman on foreign affairs, had taken a far greater interest in Timor than any of the Labor ministers. He met José Ramos Horta on each of his visits to Australia and gave him a good deal of encouragement. He made great show of opposing the Labor government's policy and yet the wording of his own policy was not substantially different. He never actually said he supported the right to independence, but only self-determination. However, by his actions, which included promising the coalition that he would visit Timor, he created the impression in the minds of Timorese (at least those who listen to the party broadcasts) that a Liberal Party government would be much more favourable towards their independence than the Australian Labor Party government.

Indonesia changes its strategy

Whether or not the Indonesian government was actually planning to invade East Timor in February-March 1975 or not, the international reaction certainly gave them something to think about.

Although the Australian government had only reacted in the mildest of terms, many trade unions, overseas aid organisations, church groups, the Australian Union of Students and the press had reacted quite strongly against the idea of an Indonesian invasion. Demonstrations were held, deputations went to the Indonesian ambassador and the waterside workers threatened to black ban Indonesian shipping if there was an invasion of East Timor, as they had done in support of Indonesian independence in the 1940's. This reaction of public opinion in Australia, and to a slight extent in Europe and North America, probably strengthened the hand of those in the divided Indonesian elite who favoured a non-military solution to 'the Timor problem'.

One of these would have been General Ali Murtopo, who had been given special responsibility for solving 'the Timor problem' by President Suharto. Ali Murtopo had solved 'the West Irian problem' in 1969 and was therefore expert in arranging 'acts of free choice' which had international approval, despite opposition from popular movements.[51]

Indonesia fears an independent East Timor for a number of reasons, one of the main ones being that it could be used as a base for any of the anti-government movements existing in the outer islands, such as the Republic of the South Moluccas, the Free Papua Movement in Irian Jaya, or even the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), whose members were bloodily exterminated in 1965.[52] It also fears that the example of an independent East Timor, particularly one which aims at self-reliance, may cause other people in Indonesia's outer islands, particularly Indonesian Timor, to want independence. This it sees as a threat.

So while Indonesia's prime aim was always the integration of East Timor there were several international factors which made it sensitive to world opinion and led Ali Murtopo to seek a solution which would stop short of outright military invasion. The ending of the war in Indo-China provided the Indonesian government with a good opportunity to make appeals to the United States for increased military aid, and numerous appeals began to be made on the grounds that "the Communists gained one million pieces of arms" due to the Communist victory in Indo-China.[53]

About the same time, the Indonesian nationalised oil company, Pertamina, was coming under international scrutiny for its very bad record of financial mismanagement and corruption; its debts had got the country even further into debt than Indonesia had been under the Sukarno government. The Indonesian government feared that various articles being written in the western press about Pertamina would discourage further investment, which it desperately needed to get Pertamina, and the country, out of its massive debts.[54]

So, for some months, the Indonesian government was trying to create an image of a steady, responsible leadership which would not go in for reckless financial deals or military adventures. An invasion of East Timor would not help this, neither did the fact that it was the tenth anniversary of the 1965 coup and massacres, and Amnesty International was launching a campaign on behalf of more than 55,000 untried political prisoners in Indonesia.[55]


THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT MAY BE CORRUPT...
..DICTATORIAL...
...OPPRESSIVE...
BUT AT LEAST IT IS NOT COMMUNIST!!

So a major diplomatic campaign was launched by Ali Murtopo in Western Europe and North America, paying special attention to the U.S. Congress and the eastern financial establishment in the USA.[56]

In April 1975 the Indonesian government probably came to the conclusion that its strategy within East Timor was not working very well; while it continued to support APODETI and broadcast attacks on FRETILIN and UDT, the unpopularity of APODETI increased while the popularity of the coalition partners, especially FRETILIN, spread very quickly.

Late in April, the propaganda from Radio Kupang stopped temporarily and Indonesia appeared to be changing its strategy. Delegations were invited from both FRETILIN and UDT to go separately to Jakarta. It seems that the UDT delegation was subjected to some hard bargaining by Ali Murtopo, as Lopez de Cruz and Augusto Mouzinho, the two delegates, were quoted on their arrival as saying over Jakarta radio that "the growing communist activities in Portugal have no bearing on developments in Timor because most of the population are religious". But after a week of talking with the Indonesians they were reported by AFP as "ending their much publicised week-long visit to Indonesia after reassessing their anti-communist platform and pledging to co-operate with the colony's pro-Indonesian APODETI party."[57]

The two UDT delegates flew directly to Australia where they were guests of Captain Alan Thompson and other former Australian commandos who had been in Timor during the second world war. They told Jim Dunn, former Australian Consul in Dili, that they had been persuaded by Ali Murtopo and General Surono to link up with APODETI to form a common front against communism, i.e. FRETILIN.[58] Given their background as members of the Portuguese fascist party before the coup, it is not surprising that De Cruz and Mouzinho were very receptive to this advice. It is possible that some sort of deal was worked out with the Indonesians on this occasion that Indonesia would not invade if UDT could come to power and declare independence under a right-wing regime, as they told journalists in Australia that they had been assured by Ali Murtopo that Indonesia had no intention of invading East Timor.[59]

By contrast, the FRETILIN delegation to Jakarta seems to have been nothing more than a public relations exercise. José Ramos Horta and Alarico Fernandez, secretary general of FRETILIN, were the guests of Ali Murtopo in the best hotels in Jakarta and Bali; they were offered women and not allowed to pay for anything they bought, but neither were they allowed to discuss Timorese politics in any serious way. After their visit a four-page broadsheet appeared in the streets of Dili full of photographs of Horta and Fernandez accepting gifts from Ali Murtopo, buying Batik shirts, visiting a car assembly plant and a Catholic cathedral. The broadhseet, written in Portuguese, was obviously intended to utilise FRETILIN's great popularity to show the Indonesians in a good light.

Soon after the return of the UDT delegation to Dili, anonymous leaflets started flooding Dili accusing certain members of FRETILIN of being members of the banned Maoist party in Portugal. These people, some of whom had been students in Lisbon, were the same ones the Indonesians had accused of being communists in the Indonesian press since October 1974. This was the first time an anti-communist witch hunt had entered Timorese politics itself, although it had always been present in Indonesian propaganda about East Timor and on the broadcasts of Radio Kupang. These broadcasts now resumed, but did not attack UDT; instead, they concentrated on individuals within FRETILIN, trying to discredit and split the party. Relations between FRETILIN and UDT became strained and at the end of May UDT unilaterally broke off the coalition, giving no reasons.

The situation deteriorated very rapidly. José Ramos Horta, who left for Australia shortly afterwards, predicted bloodshed if the coalition was not maintained, and had done his best to maintain it. The MFA administration was trying to get the parties to agree on a basis for the Macau summit talks which would determine the nature of a transitional government. FRETILIN felt that the Portuguese had gone back on a previous guarantee to recognise the right to independence and would not attend the talks if this were not the basis. APODETI would not attend if it was. APODETI members went to Maucau early, together with representatives of the Indonesian government, and persuaded the Portuguese to make no mention of independence at the talks. The President, Xavier do Amaral, and Vice-President, Nicolau Lobato, of FRETILIN were both attending the independence celebrations in Mozambique and Horta was in Australia when the vital decision had to be taken on whether to attend the talks. When the decision was made not to attend there were some regrets, on the part of Horta at least. But, like most of the FRETILIN leaders, he believed that the most important thing was that they had the support of most people in Timor, a fact which undoubtedly was true.



Above *Francisco Xavier do Amaral, President of FRETILIN and of East Timor left the priesthood because he was so opposed to Portuguese colonial rule.*
Right *Enthusiastic FRETILIN supporters at the first anniversary celebrations.*

The Macau summit in mid June was ostensibly to work out a procedure for decolonisation, and elections in October 1976 were planned. But it seems as if almost none of the participants at the Macau summit believed they would ever take place as various other things were being planned behind the scenes. For example, FRETILIN claims that UDT leaders were doing deals with wealthy Chinese in Hong Kong and Macau during the talks, and also with representatives of Australian and Japanese industry who planned big investment in the tourist industry. At a press conference in Melbourne in September, Jose Ramos Horta claimed that FRETILIN had documentary evidence, in the form of letters captured from UDT prisoners that economic interests in Australia, Japan, Hong Kong and Indonesia had offered financial aid to the UDT, but declined to name the companies.[60]

Following the Macau talks, the MFA officers seem to have dropped their attempts at neutrality between the three parties and Governor Lemos Pires definitely took the side of UDT, helping them to organise a demonstration in Dili in support of the Macau summit. Majors Mota and Jonotas attempted to pursue the decolonization program.

Several of the UDT leaders began spending more time

outside of Timor than in it. Lopez de Cruz visited Japan, where he announced to the *Japan Times* that he wanted a support committee to be set up in Japan, similar to those in Australia and Macao. He said several Japanese private interests had offered Timor three investment plans, including a dam, electric power development and livestock industry development. He claimed that UDT had the support of 70% of the Timorese people and opposed "economic exploitation by the capitalist and imperialist systems as well as by Communism".[61]

These talks with business interests in various parts of the world, together with the talks with the Indonesian government, must have encouraged the UDT leaders to overestimate the degree of support they had both inside and outside East Timor and contributed to the decision to stage the coup.

On August 2, Lopez de Cruz and Domingos Oliveira, General Secretary of UDT, made an unpublicised visit to Jakarta. De Cruz was returning from an extensive visit of South East Asian countries canvassing support for UDT. Several days later, João Carrascalau, head of the UDT Foreign Affairs committee, was summoned to join them. According to the Portuguese Consul in Jakarta, this was the first time a UDT delegation to Jakarta did not visit him. They spent most of their time talking to Ali Murtopo, probably trying to gain support and arms for projected action against FRETILIN. They were hopeful of gaining it, as they claimed FRETILIN was planning to stage a coup and on an earlier visit de Cruz had told the Indonesians they would be sympathetic towards integration with Indonesia.[62]

The UDT attempted coup

Three days after their return to Dili, the UDT staged, in the early hours of August 11, what it chose to describe as 'a bloodless coup'. The Indonesian Consul in Dili was informed some time in advance of UDT's intentions. The FRETILIN intelligence organisation also found out about the UDT's intentions some days before and warned the Portuguese authorities, but Governor Lemos Pires took no action against UDT and the Chief of Police, Lt. Col. Maggiolo Gouvea started arresting some FRETILIN leaders. FRETILIN waited until 15 minutes before the UDT coup before they took to the hills; the Portuguese action they were expecting never came. Instead the Portuguese officials confined all soldiers to their barracks, knowing that most of them supported FRETILIN. For some days UDT retained control of Dili and Baucau and the communications facilities. Lopez de Cruz broadcast a series of messages to various parts of the world indicating where UDT was expecting to get support from: all the free nations in the world, all nations of the South East Asia region; the Portuguese consul in Australia; 'Canberra' and 'Guam'.[63] The messages were transmitted by Roger Ruddock, an Australian pilot who previously worked for the Timor airline, and all asked for assistance in the form of weapons. The UDT messages also claimed that Majors Mota and Jonotas were communists "trying to deliver Timor to the Marxist FRETILIN".

Roger Ruddock on his return to Australia admitted on TV that he had been flying for UDT, carrying men and guns and dropping 'improvised bombs' on Dili, where he had been told by UDT there were "no civilians, only FRETILIN".[64] He also appears to have been a major source of 'butchering babies stories' . . .

UDT also had the support of the police forces led by Lt. Gouvea, who unsuccessfully led a raid on FRETILIN positions in the mountains in the first days following the attempted coup.

Some days after the 'coup', Major Mota and Major Jonotas were forced to leave for Portugal. In an interview in Darwin as he was leaving, Major Mota said he thought that UDT had been told by the Indonesians that the only way they could be independent would be to establish an anti-communist country. The UDT certainly made use of anti-communism to stir people up against FRETILIN. At first it seemed as if they were trying only to attack the left of FRETILIN and attract former FRETILIN supporters to UDT, but this plainly did not work. By August 20 the Timorese troops in the Portuguese army left their barracks and went almost completely to the side of FRETILIN. Led by Lieutenant Rogerio Lobato, they succeeded in capturing the munitions store in Army Headquarters in Dili. By September 8, UDT had been forced into retreat and their main stronghold was Liquica, 25 km west of Dili. Governor Lemos Pires and Portuguese troops evacuated to the island of Atauro, where they claimed to be carrying on the administration of the colony. The remaining UDT forces fled to Maubara, where they were picked up by Indonesian barges and evacuated to Indonesia. UDT leaders, Lopez de Cruz, Domingos Oliveira and João Carasalau occupied the old fort of Batugade for some time but were forced by FRETILIN forces to return to the Indonesian side of the border.

Stories from refugees arriving in Darwin showed that they had picked up the Indonesian style of anti-communist rhetoric against FRETILIN and there were stories of indiscriminate killing, babies having their heads cut off etc., although no one actually claimed to have seen this happen. The world's press were congregating in Darwin, hoping to get into Timor, but obstruction from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs prevented news of what was going on in Timor getting out. By the time the first team of journalists got to East Timor – by boat, as the Australian government would not give permission for any aircraft carrying journalists to take off from Darwin – the fighting had mainly died down and FRETILIN was well in command.[65]

The Portuguese government attempted to send an envoy, Major Antonio Soares, to Timor about ten days after the attempted coup. However, from the moment he arrived in Jakarta he was harassed by Indonesian immigration, police, and security officers. By the time he reached Bali he was told he could go no further, and no reasons were given. Even as he left Jakarta for Europe he was subjected to further harassment at the airport. The Portuguese government summoned the Indonesian Ambassador in Lisbon and charged the Indonesian authorities with preventing the special envoy from reaching Portuguese Timor. The Australian government must have been slightly embarrassed as Foreign Minister Willesee had recently stated the most urgent need was for Portugal to reassert its control over the territory.[66]

Any journalists who tried to reach East Timor via Indonesia got similar treatment to that given the Portuguese envoy. East Timor therefore became sealed off to outside observers and Indonesia had the monopoly on information from the territory. This they utilised to the full; ANTARA news agency and the Indonesian press were full of stories of atrocities committed by the 'Communist FRETILIN' and of refugees swarming across the border. It was obviously in Indonesia's interest to exaggerate the fighting, so it could justify moving in to take control. Gerald Stone and all foreign observers who went to Timor after him found that there had been considerably less fighting than had been reported and less people killed. Yet the Indonesian press continued to publish information on East Timor that was obviously untrue.

The Indonesian government probably expected Portugal to be more ready to give up the colony which was so obviously at the bottom of its priorities. But despite Portugal's problems at home and in Angola, the Portuguese government did not show any inclination to invite the Indonesians to intervene. Portugal did invite Indonesia to become part of a joint peace-keeping force with Australia, Malaysia and Portugal, but that plan fell through due to Australia's unwillingness to participate.[67]

Australian attitudes

The Australian government's first statement following the attempted coup showed that it was following through its policy of avoidance of the issue, denigration of the political movements in East Timor, and leaving the way clear for Indonesia to do anything it wished. So, although the Portuguese government had made a request to Australia to convene a meeting of the warring parties, Mr. Whitlam, in parliament, explicitly rejected such a course as it "could lead to a situation where Australia was exercising a quasi-colonial role in Portuguese Timor". Such spurious anti-colonial arguments, however, were not applied to Indonesia. In the same speech, he said: "We, for our part, understand Indonesia's concern that the territory should not be allowed to become a source of instability on Indonesia's border . . . Indonesia's concern about the situation in the territory has now led her to offer, if Portugal so requests, to assist in restoring order there." He also insulted the Timorese people and misrepresented history by saying that "none of the three political groups in the territory has shown any genuine willingness to work with the others".[68]

José Ramos Horta, listening to that speech from a member's room in Parliament House, felt that Australia had indeed betrayed the Timorese, insulted the people, and given a green light to the Indonesians to invade. Members of the ALP Caucus Foreign Affairs committee who had been to Timor were also incensed, and immediately wrote a letter to Mr. Whitlam accusing him of being unrealistic in expecting Portugal to re-exert control and pointing out that Australia, being respected by all of the parties to the conflict, would be in a good position to mediate.[69]



Andrew Peacock, Liberal Party spokesman on Foreign Affairs, took the opportunity to accuse Mr. Whitlam of washing his hands of the Timor problem. But he did not put forward any significantly different policy himself, besides suggesting that ASEAN should become involved in a solution. What Mr. Peacock failed to explain, however, was that involving ASEAN would lead to no different solution than giving the green light to Indonesia, as all the ASEAN countries respect Indonesia's authority in an area like this and would support anything it wanted to do.

Malcolm Fraser and Doug Anthony (now Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister) apparently were not satisfied with Andrew Peacock's low key criticism of the Labor government's Timor policy, for two days later they cross-examined Mr. Whitlam in parliament as to whether he was going to stand by and let the communist FRETILIN take over in Timor.[70]

The general bipartisanship of the Australian policy on Timor is mainly due to the strong influence of the Department of Foreign Affairs, particularly the Jakarta Embassy and its Ambassador Dick Woolcott, who happened to be present at the Whitlam-Suharto talks in Jogjakarta in 1974. The decisions not to re-open the consulate in Dili, to try and frustrate the passage of journalists to Timor and to try and discourage Australian voluntary aid agencies from getting involved were all decisions of Foreign Affairs made to fit in with the overall policy of unquestioning obedience to Indonesia's wishes. Whichever government is in power in Australia, this policy does not change.

However, the events of August created a few strains within the Department of Foreign Affairs and some disagreement emerged, manifesting the contradictory aspects of Australian policy. Foreign Affairs knew it was impossible to pursue at the same time a policy of integration in Indonesia and a policy of self-determination, but this was what had been laid down by Mr. Whitlam in September 1974. Officers from the Indonesia desk of the Department of Foreign Affairs pursued the former policy; some others, particularly those with experience in Portugal or Africa, felt that self-determination should be pursued more strongly. The overall effect was to take no initiatives, to do whatever was done as secretly as possible and to discourage public debate. Any government statements on Timor always referred to Indonesia's interests above those of the people of East Timor, although there was always token references to 'self-determination' – a very vague concept. Australia always maintained it was not a party principal in Timor, while knowing well that whatever Australia did would be crucial.

Much later, Foreign Affairs and Mr. Whitlam realised that they had underestimated the strength and degree of support for FRETILIN and independence, a fact which made their policy obviously contradictory. By this time it was too late to have any influence on the Indonesian government.

FRETILIN takes control

During September 1975 great changes took place in Timorese politics. The Portuguese Governor and his administration left for the island of Atauro in Dili harbour at the end of August, taking with them the only remaining doctor and a large supply of the colony's food, and leaving behind an administrative vacuum which was filled by FRETILIN. FRETILIN itself expanded greatly, due to the influx of men from the army, and began to restructure itself as an administration. The activities it had already begun proved very useful in this and soon work brigades were organised in agriculture and people's shops set up under the management of local committees. A form of local government structure was set up with representatives of FRETILIN, the army, UNETIM, the Women's organisation and the workers union to carry out actual administration.[71]

APODETI, which had not taken much part in the fighting, took refuge in the Indonesian consulate, where they were held with protection from FRETILIN guards. They were later transferred to the Museum. The UDT leadership split in three directions: three went to Indonesia – Lopez de Cruz, Domingos Oliveira and João Carascalau; three to Australia – João Martinez, Abilio Enriques and Tony Mota. The rest of the central committee, including Costa Mouzinho, were captured by FRETILIN and remained in Dili. The three different wings of the former UDT leadership now have sharply divergent attitudes. Those who went to Indonesia changed their policy from independence to that of integration with Indonesia. Those who came to Australia, like most of the wealthier classes of Timorese who came in the refugee ships, only want to settle down and get permanent residence in this country, so they do not engage in politics. However, Mouzinho and many of the former UDT supporters in Dili claim that de Cruz, Oliveira and Carascalau no longer represent UDT, as they have changed its policy beyond recognition, and that many of their former supporters have joined FRETILIN as it is the only party supporting independence.[72]

Of course, de Cruz, Oliveira and Carascalau may not have had much choice once they reached Indonesia as to what their party platform would be. It obviously suits the Indonesians to have another party besides the discredited APODETI supporting integration. The Indonesians even managed to drag up two other parties from East Timor, Kota and Trabalista, which were so small that the Portuguese did not consider them worth including in the process of decolonisation.[73] It is worth pointing out that there have been several minor parties in East Timor, including one which started in March 1975 for integration with Australia; this party was much more popular than Kota or Trabalista ever have been, but suffered a setback when totally rejected by Australia.[74]



"It's my act of free choice."

FRETILIN's only outside assistance came from Mozambique, a country which only got its own independence during 1975 but which has given unfailing diplomatic assistance. FRETILIN established its first diplomatic post in Lourenzo Marques and at the end of September, at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation chaired by Samora Machel, 49 countries supported a resolution recognising FRETILIN as the representative of the Timorese people and opposing Indonesian intervention in East Timor.[75]

Towards the end of September 1975, UDT and APODETI joined forces, together with the minority parties to form, MRAC, the Anti-Communist Revolutionary Movement. The Indonesian press gave a lot of publicity to this movement and always quoted it as an authority on East Timor. Militarily it was largely based on refugees who had been arriving across the border for military training in Atambua for almost a year, encouraged by the Rajah of Atsabe, an APODETI leader. These refugees were augmented by Timorese fleeing from the August UDT coup and finally by the pro-Indonesian elements of the UDT leadership.

When the UDT leaders arrived in Indonesia the Indonesian government seemed to use them, rather than APODETI as spokesmen of the Timorese people, although leaders of the smaller parties were also used to give the impression that there were many parties opposing FRETILIN.[76]

Indonesia was still denying having any role in the fighting in East Timor when on October 1 over 100 people entered the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra and protested against Indonesian involvement in East Timor. The Ambassador addressed the demonstrators saying he knew nothing of any Indonesian attack on East Timor but added that 'if such an attack had taken place it would only have been in retaliation to FRETILIN attacks on Indonesia'. He also claimed that the Timorese people would welcome an Indonesian invasion as East Timor was still in a state of anarchy.[77] The reaction to that first sit-in was quite strong; the Indonesian Foreign Office issued a statement which described the incident as 'a breach of diplomatic relations' and a group of members of the KNPI, a government-controlled youth organisation, staged a demonstration at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.[78] The Australian Ambassador, Mr Dick Woolcott, was clearly worried about the decline in Australian-Indonesian relations the incident had caused and told the Indonesian demonstrators that 'such undiplomatic methods will not be used again'.[79] But that was only the beginning of what was to become a long series of actions by students, trade unions, church people, aid organisations, and even members of parliament against both the Indonesian and Australian policies on East Timor.

Public opinion in Australia was definitely on the side of FRETILIN, a national opinion poll conducted at the end of September found that two out of every three Australians felt that East Timor should become independent, two out of three were against sending troops to Timor and Australians were two to one against Indonesia taking over East Timor by force 'if a left-wing group gains control there'.[80]

Five Australians Killed in East Timor

An indication of the lengths to which the Australian Government would go along with the Indonesians was shown by its treatment of the death of five TV newsmen. The five, journalist Greg Shackleton, cameraman Gary

Cunningham and sound recordist Tony Stewart of Melbourne's Channel Seven, together with journalist Malcolm Rennie and cameraman Brian Peters of Sydney's Channel nine were last seen in the border town of Balibo on October 16 before it came under attack from combined UDT-APODETI forces led by Indonesian troops.

At first FRETILIN believed the five could be prisoners of the UDT and APODETI and offered to exchange 100 of their prisoners for the Australians. [81] However Lopez de Cruz claimed they had been killed in the fighting between UDT-APODETI troops and FRETILIN and that four bodies had been found in a house marked 'Australia'. [82]

The Australian Embassy in Jakarta sent one of its officers to the border area to identify the bodies, but he didn't get any further than Kupang and found no information on the newsmen. [83] Already there were several mysterious aspects to the incident, immediately UDT announced they had found the bodies they were identified as European, later they claimed the bodies were burnt beyond recognition, and a picture of the house in which UDT claims the bodies were found shows no signs of fire damage from the mortar attack which supposedly killed them.

There is more evidence to support the eyewitness account of a FRETILIN medical orderly which chan nel 9 submitted to the Australian government. The medical orderly, Guido de Santos, who was one of the last FRETILIN members to leave Balibo, says the newsmen were filming the landing of Indonesian helicopters in Balibo. He estimated about 300 Indonesian regular troops entered Balibo. When the shooting began the Australians took their equipment and went to the village area, one of them was machine-gunned, the others tried to surrender, pointing out that they were Australians. He last saw the others with their hands up shouting 'Australians' 'Australians'. Mr Gerald Stone of Channel 9 network called on the Australian government to instigate a full enquiry into the deaths as there was now the possibility that the killing of the newsmen was a deliberate act by military forces who recognised them as Australians, as journalists and as civilian non-combatants in the act of surrender. [84]

The Australian Journalists Association, Victorian Branch and the Victorian Labour Party Conference demanded an enquiry into the deaths and waterside workers in Melbourne refused to load cargo on an Indonesian ship,the *Gunung Kerintji,* in protest at the killing of the newsmen. Father Mark Raper, who visited East Timor for the Australian Council for Overseas Aid heard a broadcast over Radio Kupang in which Lopez de Cruz told listeners 'We killed the Australian Communist journalists, and we'll kill any others that come along'.[85] A tape of this was given to the Foreign Affairs Department but the only comment that the Government could make was that the newsmen appeared to have been killed in fighting between rival factions.

It was nearly a month after the deaths when the Indonesian intelligence body BAKIN handed over to the Australian Embassy in Jakarta what was supposedly the remains of four of the newsmen, together with passports, other personal effects and camera equipment, which strangely showed no sign of fire damage. The Indonesian government still maintained its troops had not been involved in the fighting and produced a letter from the Rajah of Atsabe, a leading APODETI member, claiming that the bodies had been found 'burnt together with the house used by FRETILIN'. [86]

The Australian government seems to have treated this as the end of the incident, although the relatives and Channel 9 are still very disatisfied. FRETILIN representatives who visited Australian said they were shocked to find that people in Timor had been more worried about the death of the newsmen than the Australian government had been.

Within the Australian community the main support for Indonesia's actions in East Timor comes from the business establishment, particularly those with interests in Indonesia. Early in November the following telegram was received by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. "On behalf of 160 Australian member companies of the Australia-Indonesia Business Co-operation Committee I urge you to have regard for strong commercial and investment links existing between Australia and Indonesia as the basis on which future cordial relations must be built. AIBCC regards Indonesian response to date in Timor as most tolerant and responsible and abhors actions and attitudes of minorities in both countries aimed at prejudicing Australia-Indonesia relations. AIBCC urges government to resist pressures for any form of censure by Australia." The cable was signed by Mr Bryan Kelman, President of the AIBCC.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Willessee replied saying,"The Australian Government is of course aware of the importance of the commercial links which have been establishedbetween Australian and Indonesia and, like you, wishes to see these links maintained and further strengthened. I would also agree with you that President Suharto's government has acted with considerable restraint in confronting the problems which face Indonesia in relation to Portuguese Timor". He went on to assure the AIBCC that in considering Australian policy towards the Portuguese Timor problem the Australia-Indonesia relationship will remain one of the facts foremost in his mind. [87]

Australian Unions and Timor

The Maritime Unions, particularly the Seamen's Union and the Waterside Workers Federation in Australia had taken an interest in Timor for some time. They had a tradition of


EAST TIMOR
We see here typical behaviour of the species BRONTOSAURUS IMPERIALISMUS
.. and of its near neighbour SEE-HEAR-SPEAK-NO-IMPERIALISMUS.
N/S

supporting struggles for independence in Indonesia and Vietnam. [88] Many union branches had heard FRETILIN speakers at waterfront meetings and had decided that if Indonesia were to invade East Timor they would ban Indonesian ships as they had banned Dutch ships in support of Indonesian independence thirty years ago.

The first Indonesian ship to be banned was the *Modenasatu* which was to have taken a cargo of frozen prawns to Indonesia. The Darwin branch of the Waterside Workers Federation imposed a ban on the ship on October 21 in protest against Indonesian attacks on border towns in East Timor. The following day Melbourne tug crews, members of the Seamen's Union, banned the *Gunung Tambora* in support of self-determination for East Timor. [89] Of course this did not please the Indonesians and Foreign Minister Adam Malik called on the unions to end their boycott saying "we praised Australian Labour in backing Indonesia's independence struggle during the revolution and now they should not be so easily influenced by incorrect information which can affect the good relations they have created". [90] But the Unions were not deterred and a week later in Sydney the *Garsa II* belonging to the State Shipping Line, Jakarta Lloyd, was banned by the Sydney branch of the Waterside Workers Federation in protest against Indonesia's military support for UDT and APODETI. [91] This ship was reported to be losing $2,500 a day sitting in Sydney Harbour. In Adelaide seamen and wharfies banned the *Gunung Kerintji* while a student spoke to the Indonesian seamen in their own language, explaining the reasons for the boycott and emphasising that it was not directed against the Indonesian people. [92]

The Indonesian government became very angry and after trying, unsuccesfully, to persuade the Australian government to intervene declared that the boycotts would only harm Australia, as "goods exported by Australia to Indonesia were goods which aided Australian joint ventures set up in Indonesia". [93] And on November 9 Dr Salim, the Indonesian Minister for Communications ordered the suspension of all Indonesian shipping to Australia in protest against the boycotts. [94]

Although there is not a great deal of Indonesian shipping between Indonesia and Australia the boycotts were significant in gaining support for Timor's independence within Australia, particularly within the Labour Party, and in encouraging other unions to take action against the Indonesian government as its involvement in East Timor grew.

The Australian Political Crisis-- November 1975

On November 11 1975, the Timorese people who had for so long been the victims of Portuguese politics, became the victims of Australian internal politics in a way which hastened their becoming victims of the Indonesian military rulers. The elected A.L.P. government was dismissed by the Governor General - the Queen's representative, Australia itself is still very much a colony,- and a Liberal (Conservative) Party caretaker Prime Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser installed. This action had several repercussions, all of them disastrous for the Timorese. It meant that the solid body of support for FRETILIN which had been built up within the Labour Party and which was just beginning to have an effect on the Minister for Foreign Affairs would now have no effect on policy. [95] Although there is some support for the independence of East Timor within the Liberal Party it is much weaker and is counteracted by the extreme right-wing leadership of the party.

The Liberal caretaker government was supposed to take no new policy initiatives, this gave them a perfect excuse for not making any criticism of Indonesia as the previous government had not, even though it became obvious to all Australians that Indonesia was intervening militarily in East Timor. However Andrew Peacock, caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs, was not deterred from trying to prevent messages from East Timor being delivered to addressees in Australia; an attempt which failed due to action of the Union of Postal Clerks and Telegraphists. [96]



PORTUGUESE MAN-O'-WAR!

But the worst aspect, for the Timorese, of the Australian political crisis and the subsequent election was that the Australian people became so concerned about their own political problems - which were many - that Timor was almost forgotten. Although news from Timor was making headlines every day it did not really become an election issue as both parties policies were so similar. Both Mr Whitlam and Mr Fraser tried to avoid mentioning Timor in their campaign speeches, Andrew Peacock used Timor only as a means of attacking the A.L.P.'s foreign policy. And the Indonesian government saw the Australian political crisis as a golden opportunity to solve 'the Timor problem' in its own way and with a minimum of criticism.

Late in November José Ramos Horta and FRETILIN General Secretary, Alarico Fernandes visited Melbourne for a national conference on East Timor organised by the state branches of the Campaign for an Independent East Timor. They showed photographs of Indonesian weapons captured in the border areas where Indonesia had been leadin attacks on villages. They also told participants at the conference that FRETILIN had evidence that Indonesia was planning an all-out invasion of East Timor in early December. This prediction was supported by warnings from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to ACFOA that Indonesia could not guarantee the safety of aid workers in East Timor after November, and reports that all commercial flights from Indonesia to East Timor had been suspended.

Both Horta and Fernandes expressed the disappointment of the Timorese people in the Australian government's lack of support. Australia was now as politically impotent as was Portugal but their bitterness against Australia was greater. "We always knew the Portuguese were colonialists, but during the second world war 40,000 Timorese were killed helping the Australians fight the Japanese, and we always believed that Australia would help us" was their message. And Andrew Peacock, who while in opposition had been very keen to be friendly with Horta, in his new position of caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs refused to see him.

FRETILIN declares Independence

It came as no great surprise to observers of Timorese politics when FRETILIN unilaterally declared the independence of East Timor on November 28 1975. FRETILIN had already been governing the country for over three months following the departure of the Portuguese for Atauro. FRETILIN had all this time continued to recognise the Portuguese as the administering power, continued to fly the Portuguese flag and sought discussions with the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon on the subject of decolonisation.

Australian journalists and aid workers who had visited East Timor were all very impressed with the way in which FRETILIN had developed politically so quickly, considering it had only been in existence for less than two years and not many of its members had much education - and that was the colonialist education of the Portuguese. [97] By May 1975, after one year of operation FRETILIN had 200,000 registered members and many more supporters, largely as a result of its literacy and agricultural projects.

The women's organisation *Organizacão Popular da Mulhere de Timor,* OPMT, organised activities for women and encouraged them to participate in literacy projects, agriculture and political life. It also aimed to counteract the subservient role which traditional Timorese society and Portuguese colonialism had both given to women. A women's army unit of 100 under a woman commander was formed at the front.

Under the direction of Dr José Gonzalves, a Belgian-trained economist the economy of Timor was planned to meet the needs of the people for the first time in history. People were being encouraged to move out of Dili where food was scarce to areas where they could work in agriculture, new land for growing crops was opened up and production co-operatives established. Chinese shops in Dili were re-opened and in the countryside 'people's shops' for essential goods were established by the local government committees set up by FRETILIN. As all the currency had been taken out of the country by fleeing Chinese merchants, or was locked in the Bank FRETILIN started printing its own money for internal use, but it still needed to negotiate with the Portuguese before any external trade could be carried out.

A barge load of supplies from agencies affiliated to the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) arrived in Dili on November 17 including seeds to start new crops, corn, flour, rice, powdered milk for children, textiles for making clothes, medical supplies and fuel for distribution of the goods. The list of goods was requested by FRETILIN and distributed in Timor on a basis of need. It should be pointed out that the Labour government refused to contribute anything to the public appeal which paid for these supplies, contributing only to the International Red Cross team which had an extremely limited charter for emergency relief only ..The Liberal caretaker government tried to prevent the fuel for the distribution of the goods being sent as Indonesia had complained it could be used for military purposes. [98]

Emergency medical needs were being met by a team of Doctors and nurses from the International Red Cross and the Association for Inter country Aid - Timor (ASIAT). FRETILIN had a health education program going in the villages and Dr Philip Chalmers of ASIAT was helping to train 100 medical workers as part of that program. International Red Cross also visited the prisoners who were mainly UDT and APODETI leaders, they were being kept in the Museum in Dili and, so as not to be a drain on the economy, worked on re-construction jobs around the capital. Indonesia later claimed that APODETI prisoners had been tortured, but all foreign observers who saw them said this was untrue, and Red Cross observers were always allowed access to them. [99]

FRETILIN's foreign policy stressed firstly, close co-operation or even membership of ASEAN after independence, secondly close co-operation with countries of the South Pacific; Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Papua-New Guinea, and thirdly close relations with other Portuguese speaking countries, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Portugal and Brazil. This shows how much FRETILIN is prepared to gear its foreign policy to the interests of Indonesia, so long as complete non interference in internal affairs could be guaranteed.

On November 28 1975 FRETILIN gave up waiting for the Portuguese to negotiate a program of decolonisation. They knew an Indonesian invasion was imminent and that a number of countries would give them diplomatic recognition and assistance if they declared independence. So at 5.55 in the evening the Portuguese flag was lowered for the last time and the new red, black and gold flag of the Democratic Republic of East Timor raised in front of the administration building in Dili. The following day Fransisco Xavier do Amaral was sworn in as the Republic's first President amid wild cheering from the people. But there was little time for rejoicing, President Xavier told the people "If we must fight and die for our freedom we will now do so as free men and women" and even as he was speaking Indonesian soldiers were capturing the town of Atabae, after five days of shelling by warships off the coast and an amphibious landing of five tanks.
On December1 Nicolau Lobato was sworn in as Prime Minister, Alarico Fernandes as Minister of Interior and National Security, José Ramos Horta as Minister of External Affairs and Information, Rogerio Lobato as Minister of Defence, Dr José Gonzalves as Minister of Economy and Statistics, Mari Alkatiri as Minister of State and Political Affairs and Abilio Araujo as Minister of State and Economic and Social Affairs. [100]

The anti-FRETILIN forces in Indonesian Timor reacted immediately to FRETILIN's declaration of independence by saying that East Timor was the 27th province of Indonesia, this was only a reiteration of what APODETI had been saying for nearly a year.

Swearing-in of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of East Timor - December 1 1975.

Indonesia Invades – December 1975

On December 2 1975 Adam Malik visited Atambua in Indonesian Timor, where military training of anti-FRETILIN forces has been taking place for nearly a year. There he announced to the press "Diplomacy is finished. It is now up to the people of East Timor". He told the leaders of the pro-Indonesian parties "You are racing against time, and you face a tough struggle ahead. However you need not worry, we will give you our full support, quietly or openly. Now we meet at Atambua, and soon we shall meet again in Dili. I expect you to invite me to come to Dili soon. The solution to the Timor problem is now in the front line of battle." [101] Of course this last statement shocked many of the Jakarta diplomats, especially the Australians, who had always believed they could persuade the Indonesians against a violent solution to 'the Timor problem'.

The following day Australian intelligence received reports that an Indonesian-led invasion of Dili was imminent and that Indonesian naval vessels were moving closer to Dili in preparation for a sea attack. A RAAF aircraft was sent to Timor from Darwin to pick up all the Australians remaining in East Timor, these were mainly medical workers and journalists. The International Red Cross team was also evacuated as Indonesia could no longer guarantee their safety. [102] However it was not so easy for three FRETILIN representatives, Jose Ramos Horta, Rogerio Lobato and Mari Alkatiri, to leave via Australia for the United Nations. Only after intense lobbying by friends in Australia did Foreign Affairs grant a transit visa for the three en route to Europe and North America.

On December 5 Malik was back in Jakarta and summoned the ambassadors of ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union and warned them 'not to be surprised' by any developments that might take place in East Timor. [103] The Australian government merely replied that it was opposed to any form of military intervention in the colony, knowing full well what was about to take place.

In the early hours of Sunday December 8 Indonesia began its attack, at least six Indonesian warships, several dozen planes and hundreds of paratroops and marines launched a massive attack on Dili. At 4.30 a.m. the warships started shelling the town, three and a half hours later 1000 paratroopers dropped from Indonesian planes had spread throughout the streets, taking the airport, the radio station, the administration building and the waterfront. In Darwin a radio message was received from Alarico Fernandes that morning saying that most of the people had gone to the hills behind Dili or into the mountains. "FRETILIN forces are trying to stop the invasion but could not halt such powerful forces. They are killing indiscriminately, women and children are being shot in the streets. A lot of people have been killed. This is an appeal for international help, we appeal to the Australian people to help us. Please help us" was the message which crackled out over the 'outpost' radio. [104]

Roger East, the only Australian journalist remaining in Dili at the time of the invasion sent a dispatch to AAP-Reuters saying that most of the estimated 18,000 people in and around Dili had moved to the hills following reports that an Indonesian invasion was imminent. No further dispatches were received from Roger East, a veteran journalist who had gone to Timor to set up a news service because he felt it was needed, and who had refused to be evacuated by the Australian government. It is now believed that he was killed by the Indonesians several hours after the invasion started, leaving no foreign observers to witness the event. Several leading members of FRETILIN were also killed that day including acting head of the armed forces, Commandante Carmo, and Francisco Borja da Costa, a poet and author of the popular Timorese independence song *Foho Ramelau.* [105]

On December 8, the day after the invasion, Malik announced that Indonesian troops, which were there at the invitation of UDT, APODETI, Kota and Trabalista parties, would soon be withdrawn as peace and order would be restored. But the radio program of the pro-Indonesian parties made no pretence of having invited the Indonesian troops to East Timor, On December 8, the newly established Radio Dili, told its listeners, "As you know from December 7, 1975 the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia of TNI) have taken over the whole of Timor. The TNI are going to help unite all the people of Timor island. So don't be afraid of the Indonesian army because it is coming to help you and give you freedom. The broadcast, significantly, made no mention of the pro-Indonesian parties, only TNI, and instructed FRETILIN forces to surrender to it. [106] The program also threatened that Indonesia would 'kill all Communists' and named President Xavier and Prime Minister Nicolau Lobato as prime targets saying they would 'tear the liver out of Xavier do Amaral'. [107]


VIVA DEMOCRACIA
MADE IN USA
WHO NEEDS VOTER SUPPORT WHEN YOU HAVE TANK SUPPORT..?

The attack was clearly timed to fit in with the political crisis and elections in Australia. The fact that President Ford and Henry Kissinger spent the night before the invasion in Jakarta did not deter the Indonesians. For Ali Murtopo and a team of Generals associated with intelligence, defence, foreign affairs, mining, foreign investment and Pertamina had had a very succesful visit to the United States in October where they spoke at length with Congress Members, the Administration and business people. [108] Following the visit the U.S. State Department had recommended, and Kissinger had agreed, that Congress double military aid to Indonesia to $42.5 million in credit purchases 'to enable it to cope more effectively with the new political realities in South East Asia. [109] And in June and November 1975 Pertamina had secured two loans, each of $425 million from a North American consortium led by Morgan Guaranty Corporation [110]

The U.S. Administration, while fully aware of Indonesia's intentions, had earlier made a request that American supplied military equipment 'should not be used conspicuously' in anything Indonesia does. [111] Yet even this seems to have been ignored, for while President Ford and Henry Kissinger were sleeping in Jakarta, at least three American supplied destroyers belonging to the Indonesian Navy were circling the island of Timor to cut it off from the rest of the world. [112]

The invasion of East Timor did not proceed at all well for the Indonesians,they seriously under estimated the strength of FRETILIN forces and the popular support the movement had. Some days after the ANTARA news agency had reported the capture of Baucau to pro-Indonesian troops it was still very much in the hands of FRETILIN being defended not only by trained FRETILIN forces but by local people using traditional weapons, spears, traps, bows and arrows with poisoned tips; and the Indonesians have suffered many casualties. [113]

On December 18 the pro-Indonesian parties in East Timor announced the formation of a 'provisional government', but the fact that they did so from the deck of an Indonesian warship in Dili harbour shows that the pro-Indonesian forces had not got very far in securing control of Dili and were not very confident about support from the Timorese people.[114] The leader of this 'government' was not any of the UDT leaders whom the Indonesians had been using as spokesmen in Atambua, but their long-time friend, Arnaldo Araujo, who had gladly admitted to the Indonesian press that he had been a collaborator with the Japanese in the second World War and who had been making visits to Jakarta regularly since June 1974. [115]

Australian reaction to the invasion

Sunday December 7 was a hot, lazy day in most Australian cities, the last week of the election campaign was beginning. Most of FRETILIN's supporters and potential supporters were either working hard for the elections or suffering a deep disillusionment with electoral politics; the news of the invasion, while not unexpected, increased their anger and their sense of powerlessness.

In Sydney 150 people spontaneously converged on the Indonesian consulate to voice their protest within hours of the first news of the invasion. In Melbourne a group of people went straight to the KLM office (which handles all business for *Garuda*, the Indonesian airline) and started a vigil which lasted all week. On the evening of the invasion over 300 people packed a small hall where the Australia - East Timor Association (Victorian branch) was formed. All those present listened to a moving report from David Scott of Community Aid Abroad, one of the last people evacuated from East Timor. He told how the Department of Foreign Affairs connived with the Indonesian Government to make sure all foreign observers were out of Timor by the time of the invasion, how Australia's sponsorship of a resolution in the U.N. was blatant hypocrisy when they knew the invasion was being planned, and how Australia was guilty of criminal neglect in failing to try to negotiate a neutral zone for the Red Cross and refusing to evacuate refugees. $1000 was raised to help send David Scott to New York to assist the FRETILIN delegates in putting their case to the U.N. The AETA became extremely active over the following weeks, working with the Timor Information Service they received messages from FRETILIN and communicated them to the press in Australia and overseas. AETA has the backing of a wide range of community organisations including the Australian Union of Students, Community Aid Abroad, the Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament, Action for World Development and some of the biggest trade unions.

Most Australians were shocked at the reaction of their political leaders, both the Liberal and Labour parties were so fearful of offending the Indonesians that they made the weakest possible statements following the invasion they knew was coming. They came in for strong criticism from all sections of the press. The *Australian Financial Review* said in an editorial "It is interesting to note the careful language which Australian political leaders are using in the wake of Indonesia's invasion of Portuguese Timor. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peacock, says he regrets the Indonesian action. Former Prime Minister Whitlam says he deplores it. Nobody condemns it." [116]

But there were several Labour party members of Parliament who saw the need to condemn Indonesia's action, including former Ministers Gordon Bryant, Dr Jim Cairns and Tom Uren. Mr Ken Fry, a Labour M.P. who has visited Timor said he hoped a future Labour government would recognise FRETILIN as it obviously had the support of the majority of the people in East Timor. In all the major cities of Australia people took to the streets to protest at the Indonesian invasion and their own government's complicity in it. In Melbourne nearly 1000 people marched to the KLM office and the Department of Foreign Affairs and heard speeches from Trade Unionists, Church leaders and aid workers denouncing the invasion and Australia's role. In Sydney, Adelaide and Canberra demonstrations of some hundreds took place.

Some Trade Unions took immediate action following the invasion; the waterside workers extended their ban to cover all cargo bound for Indonesia, workers at the Government Aircraft Factory which manufactures engine for sabre jets given by Australia to the Indonesian air force put a ban on all military equipment for Indonesia.[117] The transport workers union in Sydney imposed a ban on *Garuda* flights to Indonesia which stopped several flights. [118] The meat industry employees union put a ban on handling meat and livestock for Indonesia and many other unions and union bodies began to discuss how they could take action against Indonesia on a long term basis. [119] In Canberra the A.C.T. Trades and Labour Council agreed to place bans on the Indonesian Embassy and the residences of the military and air attaches.[120] The President of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, Mr Bob Hawke, said that the Union movement strongly objected to Indonesian intervention in Timor and that Union action against Indonesia would be considered by the A.C.T.U. [121] But not all bans were successful – 200 tonnes of barbed wire managed to be delivered to Pertamina and two Nomad aircraft were delivered to the Indonesian air force despite great efforts by the unions involved to prevent them being delivered. [122]

Churches and overseas aid agencies also took a strong stand against the invasion. TheNational Commission for Justice and Peace of the Catholic Bishops of Australia had earlier asked the Australian government to protest against Indonesian intervention in East Timor. [123] The Australian Council for Overseas Aid executive passed a resolution calling on the Australian government to help establish a neutral zone for refugees and to insist that International Red Cross be allowed to return. ACFOA also called on the government to suspend all military aid to Indonesia until it ceased its intervention in East Timor. [124] Five Anglican Bishops also sent a telegram to the Prime Minister asking the government to take action on the evacuation of refugees and the setting up of a neutral zone. [125]

International reactions to the invasion

From all over the world came protests at the Indonesians' action. Only four African countries had had time to announce their recognition of the Democratic Republic of East Timor before the Indonesians took over the capital of Dili. But many countries offered diplomatic support and condemned the Indonesian invasion.

One of the first countries to condemn the invasion was China; the *People's Daily* said "Indonesia's large scale invasion has fully revealed its ambition to annex East Timor". Portugal immediately cut off diplomatic relations with Indonesia, and several hours later Indonesia reciprocated. The Portuguese government also called on the United Nations Security Council to end the invasion immediately as Portugal was no longer capable of defending the territory.

Opposition to the invasion was particularly strong in Papua New Guinea which had itself only been independent for about three months. Although the Prime Minister Michael Somare took a very non-committal stand on Timor other prominent citizens voiced the very real fears of the Papua New Guinea people. Mr Bernard Narakobi, chairman of the Law Reform Commission said that Papua New Guineans should beware of Indonesian imperialism, they must realise the Indonesian threat and be prepared. He said that he had been told in Australia that pro-Indonesian troops captured during the fighting had been carrying letters from Indonesian Generals telling them to watch closely the secessionist movements in Papua New Guinea. The Papua New Guinea daily *Post Courier* quoted Mr Narakobi's statements at length and said in an editorial 'we would do well to heed what he has to say'.[126] At a demonstration of over 200 people outside the administration offices in Port Moresby organised by the Womens' Action Group, Mr Paul Langro, deputy opposition leader in the PNG parliament told those present, 'I do not trust a country that is determined to extend its dominion through imperialism'. His electorate shares a border with West Irian. [127] There has been considerable disquiet in Papua New Guinea recently over Indonesia's actions in West Irian where military activities have stepped up since Papua New Guinea's independence, yet Prime Minister Somare turns a blind eye to it. Following the invasion of East Timor the Minister for Corrective Institutions and former Minister for Police in PNG said that Indonesia's action in Timor was an example ot "military intervention and imperialist expansion" and that people in West Irian were living a nightmare under Indonesian rule. He warned that the PNG government could no longer pretend, and ignore the nightmare the West Irianese have been through.[128]



BIRD OF PARADISE!

In London 110 members of the British Parliament signed an Early Day Motion condemning the invasion and calling for the Government to review the British aid commitments to Indonesia unless the troops be withdrawn immediately. A demonstration was held outside the Indonesian Embassy in London at which some of the M.P.s were present. [129] A demonstration was also held outside the Indonesian Mission to the U.N. in New York by Americans who were incensed at the U.S. backed invasion which took place only hours after President Ford left Jakarta.

International organisations of different types have given support to the right for independence of the Timorese, the World Conference of Representatives of 125 National Peace Movements convened by the World Peace Council in Leningrad at the end of November gave wholehearted support to the Timorese people, represented by FRETILIN and warned against outside influence, particularly from Indonesia. The World Council of Churches, meeting in Nairobi (a meeting which was originally to have been held in Jakarta) called on Indonesia to withdraw its armed forces and requested Australia to facilitate the evacuation of refugees from East Timor. [130]

The Indonesians seriously miscalculated the strength of FRETILIN resistance and its international support. They were obviously hoping to get 'the Timor problem' out of the way by the end of the year. But FRETILIN resistance was so strong and had so much support from the Timorese that a second, much larger invasion was carried out on Christmas day involving from 15,000 to 20,000 top Javanese troops. [131] Over a month after the original invasion Indonesia still had not secured much more than the centres of Dili, Baucau and Manatuto in addition to towns near the border held before the invasion.

Timor and the United Nations

One of the tragedies of the Timor story is that it took so long to reach the U.N. Indonesia had opposed discussion of East Timor in the U.N. as long as it could, Australia never attempted to raise the issue, and Portugal did so only as a last resort. But the parties in Timor had been eyeing the U.N. for some time. In February 1975 APODETI sent a long telegram to the U.N. Secretary General asking for the U.N. to supervise a referendum in East Timor, this appears to have had some support from Indonesia as it was mentioned in the Indonesian press. [132] FRETILIN had been communicating with Salim Salim, chairman of the U.N.'s Special Committee on Decolonisation (the 'committee of 24') and Tanzania's permanent representative to the U.N. They wanted a fact finding mission appointed by this committee to visit Timor. While APODETI clearly had in mind a role for the U.N. similar to that it played in West Irian FRETILIN was hoping for a mission similar to the one which visited Guinea-Bissau in 1972 and paved the way for independence. What eventually took place was what Indonesia had feared most, a discussion in the U.N.'s Fourth committee (trusteeship committee) and the General Assembly where the initiative was seized from Australia, New Guinea and the ASEAN countries in favour of a draft resolution put forward by several African countries. This resolution called for the withdrawl of the armed forces of Indonesia whereas Australia had sponsored a resolution which did not even name Indonesia. Australia voted for the African resolution, probably for electoral reasons, 'with reservations' and incurred the wrath of Indonesia. But when the debate came to the Security Council Australia demanded a voice and again played a role of trying to tone down criticisms of Indonesia. The unanimous Security Council resolution condemning Indonesia and appointing a special representative to visit East Timor was a great victory for FRETILIN and its supporters in many countries. It is significant that only 11 countries voted against the General Assembly resolution and among those which voted for it was the powerful block of Islamic states, including Arab nations which Indonesia had counted on for support and which form a significant part of the 'Group of 77' (non-aligned nations). This could make Indonesia's continued membership of that body doubtful.

What has Indonesia gained ? The Generals certainly have not gained economically for although there is oil in East Timor reports coming from Jakarta indicate that it will not be exploited for some time, as one of the arguments used to justify Indonesia's takeover of East Timor was its economic unviability. [133] Indonesia has not solved 'the Timor problem' it has merely opened up another area of opposition to the Jakarta regime. Internationally too Indonesia will suffer as more people become aware of the true nature of the Indonesian government, the stories of atrocities in Dili, torture and largescale indiscriminate killing are easily believed when one considers the massacres in Indonesia itself in 1965-66. The only countries which openly support Indonesia's action in Timor are Malaysia and the Philippines which have a similarly repressive way of treating their own people.

Indonesia's cynical disregard of the United Nations is shown by its protestations that the security council resolution cannot be imlemented because the troops are 'volunteers'. It does not expect us to beleive that the warships, planes and tanks are all volunteered too! Other nations which have shown such cynical disregard for the U.N. such as Chile and South Africa have found themselves the target of well co-ordinated international campaigns. Indonesia could not afford that as its economy is so dependent. But with FRETILIN commanding so much support internationally this is sure to happen. No one will be taken in by an 'act of free choice' which Indonesia may want to conduct in East Timor.

The Aid Debate

As Indonesia is already aware, a major debate is going on within many donor countries about aid to Indonesia, both military and non-military. Within the Australian Labour Party it has been going on for some years, it received a great deal of publicity when it was revealed in 1974 that Australia was teaching interrogation techniques to Indonesian military trainees in South Australia. [134] Since the death of the five TV newsmen in Timor it has become an issue again. In Britain the Minister for Overseas Development lost her job because she advocated less aid for Indonesia, because of the political prisoners and because Indonesia is an oil-rich country. [135] In the U.S.A. both liberal and conservative Congress members (for different reasons) have advocated a reduction in aid to Indonesia, (despite Ali Murtopo's lobbying) and the Congress recently passed ammendments preventing aid being given to regimes which practice torture and large scale political imprisonment which may apply to Indonesia. [136] And the Dutch Minister for Overseas Development Co-operation, Jan Pronk, speaking at a meeting of the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in May 1975 warned that unless there was an improvement in the situation of political prisoners in Indonesia it is likely that there would be a re-appraisal of Dutch aid to Indonesia. [137] Since Indonesia's brutal invasion of East Timor these threats of cutting off aid are even more likely to be carried out. For surely the people of East Timor are entitled to their independence under the government of their choice and FRETILIN have shown themselves, in almost everyones eye but the Indonesians to be true representatives of the aspirations of the people of East Timor.

aid often means preventing changes that are required



Footnotes and guide to further reading

1. The only general anthropological survey of East Timor in English is A. Capell, "Peoples and Languages of Timor", *Oceania*, Vol. 14, 1943-44, pp. 191-219; 311-337; and Vol. 15, pp. 19-48.

2. Capell, p.196.

3. The main historian of the Portuguese in East Asia is C.R. Boxer. See his *Fidalgoes in the Far East 1550-1770* (The Hague, 1948), especially chapter XL, "Turbulent Timor"; also "Portuguese Timor: A Rough Island Story 1515-1960", *History Today*, May 1960.

4. For a study of the political economy of Timor in the early days and the changes brought about by colonialism see Grant Evans, "Timor: the Dynamics of Underdevelopment and Independence", *Intervention*, No.5 April 1975, p5-22. (P.O. Box 104, Carlton 3053 Victoria, Australia

5. Jill Jolliffe, "Timor: History of the Revolution", *Nation Review*, October 3-9, 1975.

6. "Revolt in Timor – Government House Looted", *The Argus* (Melbourne), 19 February, 1912.

7. "Great Island Battle – Timor Rebels Defeated – Killed Number 3,000", *The Argus*, 26 August, 1912. See also Abilio Arujio, *Elites of Timor*, Canberra 1975.

8. Capell, op.cit., p. 198.

9. Peter Hastings, "The Timor Problem II: Some Australian Attitudes, 1903-1941", *Australian Outlook*, August 1975 gives some interesting insight into early Australian attitudes to Timor.

10. Jim Dunn, *Portuguese Timor Before and After the Coup; Options for the Future*, unpublished paper, Foreign Affairs Group, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, August 1974, pp. 3-4.

11. Bernard Callinan, *Independent Company*, Heinemann, Melbourne 1953.

12. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates – House of Representatives, 14 October, 1943, p. 573.

13. Peter Hastings, "The Timor Problem II", op. cit., p. 193.

14. Bob Reece, "Portuguese Timor 1974", *Australia's Neighbours*, April-June 1974, p. 7.

15. For a graphic description of the Australian and Indonesian seamen's struggles to support the new Republic of Indonesia against the Dutch, see Rupert Lockwood, "The Indonesian Exiles in Australia", *Indonesia* (Cornell University, Ithaca, USA), October 1970, pp. 37-56. Joris Ievens film *Indonesia Calling*, gives an indication of the strong solidarity between the Australian and Indonesian seamen during the boycotts, and Rupert Lockwood's recent book *Black Armada* (Australasian Book Society, Sydney 1975) analyses the impact of the bans on Australia's policies on racism and colonialism. "Out with the Colonial Dutch" *The Bulletin*, December 13 1975 is an interview with Lockwood about some of the events in his book and their relevance for Timor.

16. Donald Weatherbee, "Portuguese Timor: an Indonesian Dilemma", *Asian Survey*, December 1966, pp. 683-695, explores the attitudes of Sukarno's Indonesia to Portuguese Timor.

17. The 1959 uprising is not well documented. See Jill Jolliffe, "Timor: History of the Revolution", *Nation Review*, October 3-9, 1975 and Bruce Juddery, "East Timor: Which way to turn?", *Canberra Times*, 18 April, 1975 for the most detailed accounts.

18. Osmar White's "Alvaro and the Market" in *Time Now Time Before* (Heinemann, Melbourne 1967) gives a picture of the difficulties of journalists in Timor before the Lisbon coup, and his articles in the Melbourne *Herald*, "Timor – Island of Fear" and "Where does Indonesia stand?", 2 and 3 April, 1963, were probably partly responsible for getting all journalists banned.

19. Michael Davenport, "Portuguese Timor: A Colonial Embarrassment on our Front Doorstep", *National Times*, 11-16 June, 1973.

20. Department of Foreign Affairs, "Australia and Portuguese Timor", *For Your Background Information* handout, 25 July, 1973, p. 5.

21. Brian Toohey, "Timor Test for Government", *Australian Financial Review*, 15 May, 1973, p. 1.

22. *The Australian*, 24 May, 1973.

23. Parliamentary Debates – The Senate, 23 May 1973, p. 1824.

24. Brian Toohey, "Willesee skirts around U.N. Portuguese issue", *Australian Financial Review*, 24 May, 1973.

25. Department of Foreign Affairs, op. cit.

26. "Indonesia would aid rising", *The Age*, 5 April, 1972.

27. Senator Don Willesee, "Military Coup on Portugal", *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, April 1974, p. 288.

28. See interview with Jose Ramos Horta, *Development News Digest* (A.C.F.O.A., Canberra), September 1974, pp. 4-5.

29. For a good analysis of Spinola's role in the Armed Forces Movement coup and his ideas on Portuguese colonialism, see Kenneth Maxwell, "Portugal: a Neat Revolution", *New York Review of Books*, 13 June, 1974.

30. *Suara Karya*, 11 June, 1974, translated in U.S. Embassy Translation Unit Press Review, 12 June, 1974, p. 4.

31. Peter Hastings, "Whitlam treads dangerous ground in Timor", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 September, 1974.

32. The Campaign for Independent East Timor (NSW), 232 Castlereagh Street, Sydney, has published the political program of FRETILIN, and also an English translation of a booklet, *What is FRETILIN*, which is distributed in Portuguese and local languages in Timor.

33. "5000 March for Independence in Timor", *Tribune*, 1 October, 1974.

34. Peter Hastings, "Whitlam Received an Unsophisticated Briefing on Timor", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 November, 1974.

35. Hugh Armfield, "Canberra Aim for Timor: Go Indonesian", *The Age*, 13 September, 1974.

36. Mungo McCallum, "Defence Department 'leak' saves day for Timor", *Nation Review*, 28 February–6 March, 1975.

37. "Maoist Movement in Portuguese Timor Stepped Up", *Berita Yudha*, 11 October, 1974. Translated in U.S. Embassy Translation Unit Press Review, 11 October, 1974, pp. 4-5.

38. Grant Evans, "Timor: Half an island up for grabs", *The Digger*, 5 November–3 December, 1974 gives a description of Almeida Santos' visit.

39. Kenneth Maxwell, "The Hidden Revolution in Portugal", *New York Review of Books*, 17 April, 1975 gives a good explanation of the Armed Forces Movement and its role in the revolution.

40. Michael Richardson, "Grassroots democracy comes to Timor", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 March, 1975 describes the local elections in a village of Lospalos.

41. Jill Jolliffe, *Report from East Timor*, Australian National University Students Association, 7 and "The Book Revolution in East Timor", *National U* (Australian Union of Students, Melbourne), April 21, 1975 describe the activities and the program of UNETIM.

42. Michael Richardson, "We'll tell Jakarta; Hands off Timor", *The Age*, 30 October, 1974.

43. Hugh Armfield, "Indonesia plans armed takeover in Timor", *The Age*, 22 February, 1975.

44. Mungo McCallum, op. cit.

45. *The Sydney Morning Herald* editorial of 27 February, 1975 used the Timor issue to raise the question of Australia's defences, probably at the suggestion of someone in the Defence Department.

46. Mungo McCallum, op. cit.

47. ANTARA, the Indonesian Government news agency, 24 January, 1975, quoted by Hamish McDonald in *The Age*, 25 January, 1975.

48. *New Standard*, 24 February, 1975.

49. Parliamentary Debates – House of Representatives, 25 February 1975, p. 644.

50. "Whitlam urged to set up Consulate in Portuguese Timor", *The Australian*, 4 April, 1975, p. 5.

51. For a biographical sketch of Ali Murtopo and his role in the West Irian campaign see Peter Polomka, *Indonesia since Sukarno*, Penguin, Melbourne, 1971, pp. 132-4. For an eye-witness description of the event, including evidence of Dutch and Australian complicity see Hugh Lunn, "Act of 'choice', Indonesian Style", *The Australian*, March 4, 1975.

52. The Republic of the South Moluccas, which has been campaigning for independence from the Republic of Indonesia since 1945, recently attracted world attention through the siege of a train and the Indonesian Embassy in the Netherlands. The Free Papua Movement has been in existence in West Irian since the 'act of free choice'



in 1959: see Carmel Budiardjo, "Asia's latest war", *New Internationalist*, 25, March 1975. and June Verrier, "Irian Jaya" 1975", *New Guinea Quarterly* August 1975, p2-20. FRETILIN has been approached by both the RSM and the Free Papua Movement but, mindful of the need to try and have good relations with the Indonesian government ignored them.

53. "Communists Gained One Million Pieces of Arms", report of a speech by President Suharto in *Indonesian Newsletter*, Indonesian Embassy, Canberra, 30th June, 1975.

54. For details of corruption leading to the crash of Pertamina see "Roll me over in the clover", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 15, 1974; "Pertamina's debt", *Petroleum News Southeast Asia*, April 1975; "A Shaky Empire", *Newsweek*, April 14, 1975.

55. For details on Indonesia's political prisoners see background material put out by the Committee on Indonesian Political Prisoners, 99 Burnley Street, Richmond, Victoria (Australia) and Tapol, 103 Tilehurst Road, Wandsworth Common, London SW18. and Tapol, (USA), c/- Richard Franke, Department of Anthropology, Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, N.J. 08854, USA.

56. For details of Ali Murtopo's activities in the U.S. see Hamish McDonald, "Indonesia launches an intensive PR offensive in the U.S. – target more arms", *National Times*, July 28–August 2, 1975.

57. Both these statements are recorded in the U.S. Foreign Broadcasts Information Service Indonesia bulletin, 24 April, 1975.

58. Jim Dunn, Portuguese Timor – *The Independence Movement from Coalition to Conflict*, Parliamentary Library, Legislative Research Service – Foreign Affairs Group, 8 October, 1975.

59. Bruce Juddery, "Timorese Leaders Meet Minister", *Canberra Times*, April 24, 1975.



60. See *The Age*, Monday, September 29 for Horta's allegation. The companies involved would undoubtedly have included Theiss Holdings, which had a joint venture in the tourist industry planned in Timor with the Japanese Daiko Knako company (see *Australian Financial Review*, June 27, 1973). Theiss-Petrosea is the South East Asian holding company with headquarters in Hong Kong. Other Australian companies which may have been involved are BHP, which has leases for all non-oil exploration in East Timor, and Woodside Burmah, which operated oil wells on the south coast of East Timor under a farm-out agreement with Timor Oil Ltd. A US company with great interests in the region is the Oceanic Exploration Company of Denver, Colorado, which signed an agreement with the Portuguese government in Lisbon for exploration rights in December 1974, despite protests from Australia. (See Michael Richardson, "Australian protest over oil concession", *Sydney Morning Herald*, March 19, 1975.) Mr John Baker of Oceanic made several trips to East Timor during 1975 and was evacuated from Dili a week after the UDT attempted coup.

61. This statement was reprinted by ANTARA news agency (July 31, 1975), which referred to UDT as "Timor's majority party"

62. Michael Richardson, "Jakarta's Timor Connection", *The Age*, August 27, 1975.

63. *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 18, 1975.

64. On ABC TV, "This Day Tonight", August 23, 1975.

65. See Gerald Stone, "Timor – Island of Tragedy", *The Bulletin*, September 6, 1975 for a description of the ways in which the Australian government tried to prevent journalists going to Timor.

66. Michael Richardson, "Indonesian ban gives hint of intervention", *The Age*, August 23, 1975.

67. Russell Skelton, "Whitlam 'no' to peace body", *The Age*, September 2, 1975.

68. Parliamentary Debates – House of Representatives, 26 August, 1975, p. 493.

69. Russell Skelton, "Labor men called P.M. unrealistic", *The Age*, 28 August, 1975.

70. Parliamentary Debates – House of Representatives, 28 August, 1975, pp. 685, 689.

71. Australian journalists who visited East Timor at this time stressed the effective, if inexperienced, way in which FRETILIN took over the tasks of administration. See John Hamilton, "My Mad, Mad War", *The Herald* (Melbourne), September 27, 1975; and John Edwards, "Timor – A New Vietnam", *National Times*, September 29, 1975.

72. Mouzinho was interviewed on Portuguese television and his views received some coverage in the Portuguese press, but none in Australia.

73. See "Who are the groups in Timor?", *Retrieval*, No. 28, December, 1975.

74. "An invitation we do not want", *The Australian*, March 5, 1975 outlines reasons for Australia's rejection of the ADITLA party in East Timor.

75. "49 Paises Apoiam a FRETILIN", *Timor Leste*, 4 Outubro 1975 (newspaper of East Timor started by FRETILIN in September, 1975).

76. See for example most issues of *Indonesian Newsletter* after September 1975 in which Timor is discussed in the words of spokesmen of the MRAC.

77. David Lockwood, "Solidarity Demonstration in Canberra, *The Battler*, October 11 1975.

78 'Indonesia Protests' *Canberra Times*, October 3 1975. This was not the first time the KNPI has been used by the Indonesian government in support of its Timor policy. According to the *Christian Conference of Asia News*, (November 15 1974) a high level delegation of the KNPI led by the chairman of its International Affairs Committee Dr Guffur (a major in the Indonesian army) visited many countries of Europe and Asia talking to members of non-governmental organisations about Timor. The main thrust of their talks seems to have been to attack the Portuguese for neglect and to claim that Indonesia had no territorial ambitions. Following the demonstrations against the Australian Embassy by KNPI the National Youth Council of Australia, which has relations with KNPIthrough the Asian Youth Council called on KNPI to stop attacking Australia on the issue of East Timor and to abide by the charter of the Asian Youth Council which strives for the right to self-determination and democracy in the Asian region. (*The Age*, December 18, 1975)

79. "Australian Government Regrets Demonstrators Action" *Indonesian Newsletter*, October 6 1975

80. See findings of Morgan Gallup poll "Portuguese Timor Should be Free", *The Bulletin* October 25 1975 p29.

81. "Prisoner swap offer on missing newsmen" *The News* (Adelaide) October 20, 1975

82 "Bodies found in Timor 'could be T.V. men' " *Canberra Times* October 21, 1975

83 "Envoy leaves to identify Timor bodies" *The Age*, October 23

84 "Balibo eyewitness account" *Canberra Times*, October 29

85 "Aid for Timor appeal launched" *The Age*, October 31 1975

86 "Remains of TV men handed over" *Canberra Times*, November 14 1975.

87 Both the AIBCC and Willesee's statements are published in *Indonesian Newsletter* November 17 1975. The Australian Indonesian Buisiness Co-operation Committee runs seminars on investment in Indonesia for Australian buisinesspeople. One of its leading members, Mr J.B. Reid, is chairman of James Hardie Asbestos Ltd, Mercantile Credits Ltd, Hardie Trading and the subsidiaries of these companies in Indonesia and Malaysia, he is also a director of BHP and of Avis rent-a-car Systems Pty.Ltd. He is continually lobbying in favour of Australian business interests in Indonesia, see *Indonesia Bulletin*, (Indonesia Action Group, Box 300 Wentworth Building Sydney University, 2006)Vol.1. No.2 for a description of the way in which the AIBCC tried to take over the Australia-Indonesia Association of N.S.W .

88. In March 1967 Australian seamen and waterside workers refused to load the ships *Boonaroo* and *Jeparit* with bombs and other war supplies for South Vietnam, the event, like the support for Indonesian independence (see footnote 15) has become part of their tradition.

89. "Wharfies, Seamen, ban Indonesian Ships" *Tribune* October 29

90. *The Age*, October 27 1975

91. *The Age,* October 30 1975

92. *Tribune,* November 12 1975

93 "Dockers boycott of ships will harm Australia" *Indonesian Newsletter*, November 10 1975

94 "Indonesia reacts to Australian boycott of ship" *Canberra Times* November 10 1975

95. On October 26 1975 the Victorian branch of the A.L.P. voted to cease all military aid to Indonesia and to cut off all other aid until Indonesian incursions into East Timor stopped, to give de-facto recognition to FRETILIN and to increase humanitarian aid to East Timor. (see *The Age* October 27 1975) four days later in Parliament Senator Willessee made the first policy statement which offended the Indonesians, he 'viewed with concern widespread reports that Indonesia is involved in military intervention in Portuguese Timor ' *(Parliamentary Debates - The Senate* October 30 1975) The following day the National Executive of the A.L.P. endorsed Willesee's statement but most members were in favour of a stronger line being taken against Indonesia and there was a good deal of support for the resolutions from the Victorian conference. If the A.L.P. had not been thrown out of office a short while later it is likely that a stronger policy on Timor would have emerged, as there is great support for FRETILIN in the rank and file of the party.

96. Immediately after the Indonesian invasion on December 7 workers at the outpost radio network in Darwin were instructed to ignore all messages coming from East Timor and to sign the secrecy provisions of the Post and Telegraphs act. The operators refused and contaced their union. The secretary of the Union of Postal Clerks and Telegraphists said that Timorese operators had helped to maintain radio communications in northern Australia during the Darwin cyclone and operators felt it was their moral duty to make public all messages received from East Timor. The order was revoked but Telecom and Foreign Affairs denied that it had ever been in force. (see CIET (N.S.W.) *International Briefing* December 12 1975, and Bruce Juddery "Operators told to ignore calls: Union" *Canberra Times* December 10 1975.)

97. See for example, Jim Dunn,'The Political situation in East Timor Appendix 1. of *Report of a visit to East Timor for the Timor task force of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid*, October 1975 available from ACFOA P.O. Box 1562 Canberra City, A.C.T. 2601. Also Jill Jolliffe 'Dili Government Working' *Canberra Times* November 20 1975 and Michael Richardson's numerous articles in *The Age* from Dili during November 1975.

98. See *The Age* Saturday November 22 for Indonesia's complaints about the fuel being sent and 'Indon fear slowing aid' *Herald* (Melbourne) December 2 1975.

99. See *Report of a visit to Portuguese East Timor* by Senator Arthur Geitzelt and Ken Fry M.P. and *Report of Activities of International Committee of the Red Cross Medical Team in East Timor* both presented to ACFOA Timor consultation on Friday 26 September 1975 and available from ACFOA.

100. For a full list of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of East Timor see CIET (N.S.W.) *International Breifing* December 4 1975.

101. "Malik Warns" *Canberra Times* December 3 1975

102. "Indons set to invade Timor" *Age* December 3 1975.

103. "Timor Invasion Hint" *The Age*, December 9 1975

104. Michael Richardson "Indons Invade" *The Age,* December 8

105. Jill Jolliffe "Fretilin claims horror killings" *The Age,* January 5 1976.

106. Michael Richardson, "Broadcast tells a different story" *The Age,* December 9 1975.

107. Bruce Wilson "Kill Reds, Timor cry" *The Herald* (Melbourne) December 9 1975.

108. see *Congressional Record* October 20, 1975 for details of the party which accompanied Ali Murtopo to the U.S. and their message to the Congress.

109. "Move to raise Jakarta Aid" *The Age,* October 22 1975.

110. Hamish McDonald "Massive Bank Operation props up Pertamina" *National Times* December 29 1975–January 3 1976.

111. Hamish McDonald "Indonesia will take Timor....in slow motion and by remote control" *National Times,* October 13 - 18 1975.

112. David Andelman, "Despite Timor,Pertamina, Indonesia lobbies for U.S. arms aid" *Australian Financial Review,* November 26 1975.

113. CIET (N.S.W.) *International Briefing* December 14 1975.

114. see message from Alarico Fernandes *Timor Information Service* No. 5 p.3. December 28 1975.

115. 'New leader for Timor" *The Age* December 19 1975. See footnote 30 for references to Araujo's wartime activities.

116. "Mr Peacock 'regrets' and Mr Whitlam 'deplores' editorial, *Australian Financial Review* December 9 1975.

117. "Union ban on jet engines" *Herald (*Melbourne) December 9 1975.

118. "Ban threat to airline" *Herald* (Melbourne) December 9 1975.

119. *Canberra Times* December 18 1975

120. "Indonesian Embassy ban agreed" *Canberra Times* December 19

121. *Courier Mail* (Brisbane) December 19 1975.

122. There were attempts by companies and the government to try and get around the union bans which were causing problems for Australia's image in Jakarta. A number of waterside workers in Sydney saw a huge consignment of barbed wire addressed to 'Pertamina, Unit 11, South Sumatra.' They decided to ban it, considering it could be war material. Lysaghts, (a subsidiary of BHP) the company which was supplying the barbed wire to the Indonesians then changed the shipping address to 'Robin's Shipyard, Singapore ' On December 4 it came aboard the *Neptune Amber* wrapped in cardboard. The wharfies were rather surprised to see such a large consignment of barbed wire going to Singapore and when they looked beneath the cardboard they saw instructions for shipment from Singapore to Indonesia. They banned the wire again so Lysaghts sent it to Adelaide where it was loaded before the wharfies there realised what was happenning. (CIET,*International Briefing*, December 12 and 14). Two Nomad aircraft given to Indonesia by the Australian government under the present military aid agreement were due to fly from Darwin to Indonesia on December 12. When the Darwin branch of the Transport Workers Union refused to refuel the planes caretaker defence Minister Mr Killen said they would not be delivered until after the elections. But following the Indonesian invasion of East Timor the Union renewed its ban as they feared the planes might be used in Timor. So the government got around the ban by calling in RAAF personnel to service the planes before being delivered to the Indonesian airforce. Another 12 Nomads are due to be delivered to the Indonesians under the present agreement. ("Indon Nomads beat Union ban" *Sun* (Melbourne) December 23 1975)

123. *Canberra Times* December 1 1975

124. Bruce Juddery "Call to Suspend Australian Aid" *Canberra Times* December 18 1975.

125. "Bishops ask Fraser to rescue Timorese" *The Australian* December 31, 1975.

126. "Beware of Indonesia , warns Narakobi" *Post Courier* (Port Moresby) December 9 1975 and editorial December 10 1975.

127. "PNG needs assurance from Indon" *Post Courier* December 12 1975.

128. "PNG Minister attacks Jakarta" *Canberra Times* December 19 1975.

129. *Tapol* No 13, December 1975

130. for full text of resolution see *Ecumenical Press Service* 11 December

131. For a detailed description of FRETILIN resistance see *Timor Information Service* weekly newsletters which include all messages from FRETILIN leaders in East Timor. "While Dili was sacked Jakarta lied and Canberra ignored it all" *National Times* January 5–10 gives an idea of the extent of Indonesian troops involved.

132. "APODETI party sends cable to U.N. Secretary General" editorial *Sinar Harapan* March 10 1975. translated in U.S.Embassy Translation Unit Press Review. On March 6 1975 Anwar Sana, Indonesian representative to the U.N. was quoted on Radio Kupang as saying 'it is not neccesary to bring up the problem of Timor in the U.N. so that all the world can know' This attitude seems to have continued. For a discussion of Indonesia's reaction to the U.N. debate see Dan Coggin "Angry words after the Bloodshed" *Far Eastern Economic Review* January 2 1976. and for a discussion of the international reprecussions see David Scott "Independent East Timor is in Australia's best interest" *The Australian* January 9 1976.

133. Hamish McDonald "Indonesia cool on Timor Oil Search" *Australian Financial Review* 29 December 1975 reports that a deal has been worked out between the companies searching for oil in East Timor and the Indonesian government under which the companies have agreed to delay exploration without protest in return for a guarantee of their present positions in the future. The major exception to this agreement is likely to be Oceanic Exploration of Denver, U.S.A. see footnote 60.

134. see Brian Toohey "Labour doubts on Military Aid" *Australian Financial Review* April 9 1973 and "Interrogation taught, for tactical training only - Barnard" *The Australian* June 22 1974. The Victorian A.L.P. conference resolution on Timor and statements by Labour M.P.s against aid to Indonesia will again bring this debate to the fore. The 'memorandum of understanding' granting Indonesia $25million worth of military aid over the next three years was signed in Jakarta by Ambassador Woollcott and General Habib (head of the Indonesian defence establishment) on the last day of office of the Australian Labour government. see Michael Richardson "We'll give Jakarta $25m in arms aid" *The Age* November 8 1975.

135. Roy Stokes "Why Judith Hart had to go" *New Internationalist* No 30 August 1975 is an interview with the former British Minister for Overseas Development in which she describes her conflict with the Foreign Office over her attitudes to aid to Indonesia which cost her her job.

136. Lenny Siegel "Arming Indonesia" unpublished paper distributed by Tapol (U.S.A.) points out that while the Ford Administration has asked Congress to double arms aid and sales to Indonesia two groups of Congress members oppose aid, conservatives are reluctant to offer assistance to a member of OPEC while liberals are concerned that continued aid will allow the Suharto regime to maintain its miserable record on human rights. David Scott (op. cit.) reports that one Congressional Committee has recommended a massive cut in arms aid to Indonesia. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act now contains a section 'Security Assistance and Human Rights' which sets out new criteria debarring U.S. military assistance to 'any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognised human rights' U.S. Congress Public Law 93 - 559, Section 503B.

137. "Dutch warn: Free Tapols or face aid cut" *Tapol* No 10 June 1975 14 member states (west European countries, the U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand belong to the Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia which meets twice a year in Amsterdam and gives Indonesia usually as much aid as it asks for. Several countries are no questioning the aid they give through IGGI.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE ON EAST TIMOR

Timorese Elites by Abilio de Araujo, 50c
Facts about FRETILIN, 50c
Timor Bulletin, subscription $A2.00

all available from C.I.E.T. (A.C.T.)
P.O. Box 514, Manuka
A.C.T. 2603 Australia.

East Timor : The Fight for Independence by Denis Freney
East Timor : International Briefing, weekly, airmail, with newspaper cuttings, $A20
Timor : Freedom Caught Between the Powers, by D. Freney

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

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

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